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DEBTS UNDER INFLATION *
ARTUR NUSSBAUM t
I. THE IMMUTABILITY OF THE NOMINAL AMOUNT
A. The Principle of Immutability
A debt is defined by its monetary unit (dollar, pound sterling, etc.) and
by the figure added, both together denoting the "sum" owed. Alterations in
the monetary field which have no bearing either upon this unit or upon this
figure do not affect the debt.' Changes in the value of the unit, whether in
terms of metal value, purchasing power or rate of exchange, are partic-
ularly irrelevant on this score. There is in continental literature a good deal
of opposition to this "nominalistic" doctrine,2 but on closer examination it
* This article will form a chapter of a volume, MONEY IN THE LAW, which is being
prepared under the auspices of the Columbia Council for Research in the Social Sciences.
t Visiting Professor of Law, Columbia University Law School; formerly Professor of
Law, University of Berlin; Lecturer, Academie du Droit International de la Haye, 1933;
author of numerous treatises, monographs and articles on commercial law, private interna-
tional law, comparative law and other fields of law.
I. The theory underlying this rule has been developed by the writer in Basic Monetary
Conceptions in Law (1937) 35 MicH. L. REv. 865.
2. Thus by HuBREcHT (later writing under the name of Hubert), LA D-PidCIATIOx
MONtAI aT' L'Exi cuTIoN DES CONTRATS. STABILIZATION DU FRANC Er VALORISATION DES
CBPANcEs (1928), a volume which, however, is very much at variance with actual French
law and the great majority of French writers: WAHLE, DAs VALORISATIONSPROBLEM IN DEk
GESETZGEBUNG UND RECHTSPRECHUNG MITTELEUROPAS (1924) ; Stampe, Das Deutsche Schil-
dentilgungsrecht des x7. Jahrhunderts (1925) SITZUNGSBERICHT DER PREusslSC]EN AKADEMIE
DER WissENscH rEN (Philologisch-Historische Klasse) 2, and a number of further studies
published in (1926) SITZUNGSBERICTE at 37 and in the ABHnANDLUNGEN of the same Academy
(and the same Klasse) 1928, 1931, and 1932, presenting ample material of monetary legal
history, chiefly French. Unfortunately they partly misinterpret facts and lack clarity of legal
analysis. See ASCARELLi, LA MONETA (1928) 293; JASTROW, DIE PRINCIPIENFRAGEN IN DEN
AuTFWERTUNGSDEBATTEN (1937) i00; TAEUBER, MoLINAEUs' GELDScEHUDLEHRE (1928) 34.
In this country the publications by Eder, Legal Theory of Money (1934) 20 CORN. L. Q. 52,
and The Gold Clauses in the Light of History (1935) 23 GEo. L. J. 359, 72r, are basically
anti-nominalist. Writings taking the nominalist point of view are numerous. Reference may
be made to AscARELLI, LA MONETA (1928) ; GUISAN, LA Di PRtCiATION MoNLTARE Er SEs
EFFET EN DROIT CIVIL (934) ; Geny, Cours Ligal et Cours Forci en Matire de Monnaie
et de Papier-Monnaie (France, 1928) REVUE TRImESTRIELLE DE DRoiT CIVIL 5; Henggeler,
Die Abwertung des Schweizerfrankens und ihr Einfluss auf die Zivilrechtlichen Verhlltnisse
(Switzerland, 1937) ZEITscHmr' FOR SCHWEIZERISCnEs REcHT 158a.
(571)
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will be found that the existing controversies do not touch upon the basic
problem under discussion. No anti-nominalist has ever advanced the prop-
osition that the amount of circulating media to be paid by the debtor should
necessarily and exactly correspond to the daily, and sometimes hourly, fluc-
tuations of the market price of gold, or of the rate of exchange or of the
purchasing power of the monetary unit. Even in the German revaluation
movement the focal point was merely an equitable restoration of the debts
entirely destroyed through the collapse of the mark. After the eclipse of
the French assignats, there was also a reEstablishment of vanished debts by
"scaling" statutes, and similar re~stablishments have occurred in other
phases of monetary history.3 However, the fact of a fading debt is, in
itself, evidence of the truth of the nominalistic view. Revaluation can only
be remedial. As a matter of fact, it is the nominalistic view which makes
perceivable and measurable inflation and deflation, and generally, the alter-
ations of the economic value of debts.
During the middle ages a "metallistic" doctrine was applied to loans; 4
that is, a definite quantity of silver or gold was considered to be the object
of a loan.8 But this was in a time of monetary imbroglio, characterized
by a multitude of coining potentates, by roughness, dissimilitudes, incessant
alterations and rerating of coins, by melting down and emigration of the
better types, and generally by monetary abuses committed by rulers as well
as subjects." There was nothing approaching a homogeneous modern sys-
tem efficiently organized and controlled by the government of a large ter-
ritory. Therefore, in making payment the money was frequently weighed,
particularly where considerable amounts were involved.7  At the same time
the object of major debts was customarily articulated directly or indirectly
in terms of a definite quantity of coined gold or silver.8  Under such con-
ditions it was a workable and fair rule to have the borrower return the
"intrinsic" value of the coin received, even in the absence of an explicit
stipulation to that effect. Thus the borrower, denied the use of capital by
way of interest under canonical law, was protected at least against loss
through monetary changes. This medieval proposition was in the nature
3. See infra p. 596.
4. This has particularly been demonstrated by HARTMANN, tYBER DEN RECTLICHEN BE-
GRIFF DES GELDES UND DER INHALT VON GELDSCHULDEN (1868) and by TAEUBFR, GELD UND
KREDIT IM MnIELALTER (1933). The Roman rule was "nominalist". ASCARELLi, LA
MONETA (1928) 4.
5. As early as 1200 Pope Innocent III adjudicated an ecclesiastical case on a metallistic
basis. See TAEUBER, op. cit. supra note 4, at 107 and 309. An old impost was running in
terms of a local type of "denars" which had long disappeared from circulation. Considering
the absence of "conversion rates", which in modem legislation regulate the transition from
one currency to another, the metallistic decision was a matter of course.
6. See JASTROW, op. cit. supra note 2, at 42, 55.
7. TAEUBFR, op. cit. suPra note 4, at 195; so even in England, CUNNINGHAu, TH1E
GROWTH OF ENGLISH INDUSTRY AND COMMERCE (5th ed. 19o) 326, n. 5.
8. Examples in TAEUBER, op. cit. supra note 4, at 96.
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of a rule in connection with loans rather than an application of a general
monetary theory.9 In a more advanced economy, it was refuted by the
great French jurist, Molinaeus (1500-1566), who also opposed the eccle-
siastical anti-interest rule.' 0 The metallistic tenet lost its ground as govern-
ments succeeded in having the monetary unit represented in appropriate
fractions and multiples, with coins readily accepted by the community, which
gradually became accustomed to rely, even in major payments, on the "name"
of the coins. Under a modern monetary system, the medieval doctrine has
no actual significance. The rule favoring nominal value was laid down
in England, in a very distinct and impressive manner, as early as 1603 in
the Case of Mixt Monies in Ireland." There it was held that the debtor,
Brett, was entitled to discharge his debt of ioo pounds in debased coin of
the same nominal amount, the debasement having been ordered by Queen
Elizabeth subsequent to the establishment of the debt. "Although at the
time of the contract and obligation made . . pure money of gold and
silver was current within this Kingdom . . . yet the mixed money, being
established in this Kingdom before the day of payment, may well be ten-
dered in discharge of the said obligation, and the obligee is bound to ac-
cept it." The court expressly cites Molinaeus amongst others as authority
for the rule applied. In England since then, no attempt has been made to
question the nominalistic principle. This is true for depreciation of the pound
during and its appreciation following the Napoleonic War as well as for
developments during and after the World War. By now the very exist-
ence of a nominalistic-metallistic problem is far from the English imagina-
tion. In the United States "dischargeability" by depreciated money, of
debts incurred before such depreciation, was, on broad grounds, judicially
certified by the Legal Tender cases, 12 which in this connection expressly
rely on the Mixt Money case. The colonial and continental inflations
9. On this see TAuBmE, op. cit. supra note 2, at 85 et seq.
10. MOLINAEUS, TRAcTATus ComCmI01Rum (or CONTRACTUUm) ET UsUaARum (first
published in 1546) is in point. According to TAEuBER, op. cit. supra note 2, the historical
significance of Molinaeus' doctrine does not consist in his nominalistic tenet but rather in the
fact that Molinaeus was the first to develop a doctrine of debts in terms of a general theory
of money. This view seems to be strongly over-emphasized by Taeuber.
ii. Brett v. Gilbert, Davis 18, 8o Eng. Rep. 5o7, 2 State Tr. 113 (1605). This case has
been strongly criticized from a metallistic point of view by Eder, supra note 2, at 722, 731.
However, the arguments advanced by Mr. Eder bear only on the King's power to debase the
coin, hence on a problem of old English constitutional law, and not on the question of how a
valid devaluation reacts on existing debts. His arguments prove nothing more than that
there was later a criticism of the Mizt Money case. Incidentally there is no disagreement
as to the fact that debasement of coins is generally undesirable and that the English consti-
tutional rule changed in the iSth century. For other expressions of the nominalistic doctrine
in the common law see Pong against Lindsay, I Dyer, marginal note 71, 82b. And Scrutton,
L. J., in The Baarn, [1933] P. 251, 265 (C. A.), "A pound in England is a pound whatever
its international value."
12. 12 Wall. 457, 548 (U. S. 1871). However, an explicit demonstration of the nominalistic
principle with an eye to continentals is to be found in the early case of Hollingsworth v. Ogle,
1 Dallas 257 (Pa. 1788).
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sufficiently illustrate the operation and efficiency of the nominalistic rule.
A more recent application of the nominalistic doctrine is to be found in
an Iowa case of 1934,13 where a mortgagee, although tendered the nom-
inal amount, insisted upon foreclosing on the ground that the dollar had
lost half its purchasing power since the time of the loan. The court, "while
sympathizing with the appellant [the mortgagee]," overruled the claim,
saying, "he has cited us no law, and we are unable to find any, through which
we may grant him the relief which he asks." 14
In France the nominalistic doctrine had been proclaimed with partic-
ular firmness and clarity by Pothier (1695-1722), who considers it to be
'Tusage constant dans notre jurisprudence". 15 It also dominated the rev-
olutionary period 16 and was incorporated in the famous Article 1895 of
the French Civil Code.17 Although the rule, in accord with the old tradi-
tion, is couched in terms of loan and placed in the chapter on loans, there
is no doubt of its applicability to all debts.1 ' There is some dispute, prin-
cipally academic, as to whether the principle enunciated by Article 1895
applies only to a debasement of coin or rather encompasses any depreciation,
including a depreciation of paper money.19 Actually, however, the second
alternative is the valid one; 20 and despite the repeated and tremendous
depreciations of the franc, no noticeable attempt at revaluation, either judi-
cial or legislative, has ever been carried through.2 1  The French model was
literally taken over by the Italian,2 2 the Spanish,23 and other Latin Codes, 24
13. Federal Land Bank of Omaha v. Wilmarth, 218 Iowa 339, 252 N. W. 5o7 (1934).
14. Id. at 351, 252 N. W. at 513.
I5. PoTirms, TRAIT- DU PRET DE CoNSoImlON, n. 36; 5 PoTHIER, OEUVRES (Siffrein,
1821) 403.
16. Dalloz, Ripertoire Mfthodique 13 Verbo "Papier-Monnaie" (France, 1924) 2 Rr.vu
DU DRoIT BANcAmRE 77.
17. "The obligation resulting from a loan in money is always simply for the amount in
figures indicated in the contract. If there has been an increase or diminution of species be-
fore the time of payment, the debtor must return the amount in figures lent and must return
this amount only in the species current at the time of payment." CODES ET Lois PoUR LA
FRANCE (Colin, 1924). On the genesis of art. 1895 see Geny, La ValiditJ T uridique de la
Clause-Or (France, 1926) REvuE TRIMESTRIELLE DE DRoiT CIVIL 557; Hubrecht, op. cit.
supra note 2, at 88.
18. See Lalou, Dalloz P6riodique, 1924 II, 2o, with references.
19. HUBREcHT, op. cit. supra note 2, at IO, advancing the doctrine that nominalism is an
"exceptional" rule. But certainly it is for paper money even more appropriate than for coin.
The narrow doctrine was used by the Mixed Appellate Court of Alexandria, May i9, 1927
(France, 1928) 55 JOURNAL DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL 768, in interpreting art. 577 of the
Egyptian Mixt Civil Code, CODES DES TRIBUNAUx MIxTEs D'EGYPTE (1896) 117, which is
almost literally taken from art. 1895 of the French Code. However, in the sense of Egyptian
legislation, franc seems to indicate "gold franc".
20. See Professor Picard, a noted French commercialist, (France, 1924) 51 JOURNAL DU
DROIT INTERNATIONAL 918. The decisions of the Cour de Cassation (Civ.) Jan. 23, 1924 are
given id. at 685.
21. Infra p. 579.
22. CODIcE CiviLE DEL REGNO D'ITALIA (1923) art. 1821. The significance of the nomi-
nalistic conception within the Italian monetary system was pointed out by the Italian Court
of Cassation, May 30, 1927, 1928 MoNITOR DEI TRIBUNALI 91.
23. C6DIGO CIvIL ESPAfiOL (Moreno, i9o6) art. 1170; C6DIGo DE ComRclo ESPA90L
(Moreno, 19o6) art. 312.
24. -Thus by the Belgian Code, CODES BELGES (1928) art. 1895, art. 2199.
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as well as by the Dutch Code. 25 However, the last, in force since 1838, and
the Italian Code, by special provisions, protect specie clauses stipulated in
favor of money lenders who would have supplied the debtor with like coin; 20
an exception clearly in confirmation of the general prevalence of the nomi-
nalistic principle.
Identity of the non-depreciated monetary unit with the depreciated has
universally been recognized even where the unit was foreign; and this is true
despite the fact that foreign money is much more closely related to com-
modities than is domestic money.2 7 In a case concerning German marks,
Justice Holmes made this broad statement: "Obviously, in fact a dollar or
a mark may have different values at different times but to the law that
establishes it it is always the same." 28
The principle of immutability applies to both depreciations and apprecia-
tions of the monetary unit. Sometimes there have been sizable apprecia-
tions. Outstanding is the appreciation of about 6o per cent of the dollar
from 1864 to 1878. A number of similar processes occurred subsequent
to the World War. Thus the English pound had depreciated about 30
per cent in 192o, and the Dutch guilder fell about 25 per cent sometime in
the same year; 29 but they wholly recovered within a few years. The lire
was stabilized in 1927 about 25 per cent over the average level held since
1922. and more than 5o per cent above its lowest level, which was reached
in August, 1926. In all of these cases the burden of debtors who had con-
tracted their debts in depreciated money was made heavier. However, as
far as it is known, no attempt was made by debtors to derive a legal de-
fense from the mere improvement of the currency.30 Practically, there-
fore, the problem of fluctuating currencies in a chapter on debts is almost
entirely a problem of depreciation.
31
B. Adaptable Debts
Although the nominalistic principle has been theoretically and actually
accepted, its boundaries are still to be charted. The most important prob-
25. LEs CODEs NERLANDAIS (1886) art. 1793.
26. Id. at art. 1794; CODIcE CivnE DEL REGNo D'ITALIA (1923) art. 1822.
27. Particularly so in the opinion of American courts. See Nussbaum, Multiple Cur-
rency and Index Clauses (1936) 84 U. OF PA. L. REv. 569, 574.
28. Deutsche Bank Filiale Nurnberg v. Humphrey, 272 U. S. 517, 519 (1926).
29. See ME- RANDUm ON CURENCY 1913-1922 (League of Nations, 1923) Tables p. 48.
30. Illustrative of the effects of dollar appreciation is The Vaughan and Telegraph, 14
Wall. 258 (U. S. 1872). The debtor had to pay a much higher value as a result of his unsuc-
cessful appeal, the Supreme Court having no power to change the dollar amount awarded by
the lower court. See also Hus v. Kempf, 12 Fed. Cas. No. 6,944 (S. D. N. Y. 1879).
31. For discussion of the influence of fluctuating currencies upon accounting and balance-
sheets, a matter not considered in this article, see BR~scrANi-TuRuoNr, THE EcoNomics OF
INLATION (Trans. by Sayers, 1937) 274; SCHKAFF, LA DPPRClATiON MONfTAIIE ET sES
EFFETS EN DROIT PRIVP (1925) 241; SCHMALENBACH, DYNAmISCHE BIuANZ (4th ed. 1926)
217; SwEENEY, STABILIZED ACCOUNTING (1936); WAHLF, op. cit. mupra note 2, at 33.
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lem is the determination of damages and other unliquidated claims under
a fluctuating currency. There is a doctrine which understands the legal
ratio between the monetary unit and the gold value to involve a fictitious
stabilization of the unit disregarding its actual depreciation or appreciation
in terms of gold value, purchasing power, etc.32 Fluctuations of the unit
in such terms are not given judicial cognizance under this doctrine which
has been called the "theory of legal constancy of value".3 3 A case decided
by the Supreme Court of the United States is illustrative. When the holder
of a gold certificate claimed damages from the Federal Government, in-
curred through the confiscation of the certificate on January 17, 1934, the
Court dismissed the claim partly on the ground that on that day the stat-
utory equation of one dollar to 25.8 grains of standard gold was still in
force; 34 that devaluation of 15 5/21 grains was decreed on January 31,
1934. Depreciation of the dollar, however, had reached the same level on
January 17, enhancing the world market price of an ounce of fine gold to
about $35, and accordingly enhanced the value of the gold dollar coins in
terms of the world market value about 6o per cent. Whether the holder of
the certificate could avail himself of the world-market rate is a troublesome
question; but admitting that he could, one can hardly deny that he suffered
a loss of sixty cents on every dollar of the face amount. Suppose the case
of a statute or a contract explicitly providing for payment in terms of
the market value of a commodity. The use of the market value in the de-
termination of the sum is then certainly not prevented by the fact that the
old monetary ratio is still in the statute books. The market value will re-
flect, and is considered by the parties to reflect, all the fluctuations of th
price of the commodity involved, regardless of whether these fluctuations
are influenced by, or are independent of, changes in the monetary standard.
The New York Court of Appeals, during the greenback period, was correct
in taking into account the depreciation of the dollar in the determination
of damages. 35  The same principle was recognized by the Reichsgericht 36
32. See Nussbaum, supra note i, at 881.
33. HARTMANN, INTERNATIONALa GEuDSCHULDEN (1882) 29; KNIEs, DAs GELD (2d ed.
1885) 285.
34. Nortz v. United States, 294 U. S. 317 (935) (one of the gold clause cases). Similar
views were advanced by the English Court of Appeal in The Baarn, [I933] P. 251 (C. A.).
In the United States during the greenback period a legal-constancy doctrine was used in
computing damages. See cases collected in Dawson, The Gold Clause Decisions (1935) 33
MicHr. L. REV. 647, 674, T 54. Even a depositor of gold coin, claiming damages from his
depository, was granted damages under the same theory for only the nominal dollar amount.
Warner v. Sauk County Bank, 20 Wis. 492 (i866). See also Dawson and Cooper, Northern
Inflation Cases (1935) 33 Micaf. L. REv. 852, 882.
35. Simpkins v. Low, 54 N. Y. 179 (1873) and other cases cited by Dawson and Cooper,
supra note 34, at 887. In Simpkins v. Low, supra, at 185, the court said: "Why should a
court be the only place where men must affect (sic) an ignorance of what all men know?"
36. Reichsgericht, March 12, 1921, 1o1 Entscheidungen des Reichsgerichts in Zivilsachen
418 (dealing with loss of stored goods) ; Reichsgericht, June 13, 1921, 1o2 Entscheidungen des
Reichsgerichts in Zivilsachen 383 (dealing with an injury wrongfully done to a horse).
Ed. Note: Entscheidungen des Reichsgerichts in Zivilsachen will hereafter be cited as
R. G. Z.
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and the highest courts of Austria 3 7 and Belgium,38 sensibly distinguishing
damages granted in terms of the depreciated currency from "revaluation"
of debts.3 9 As for changes in purchasing power not resulting from altera-
tions in the monetary system, American courts generally make allowance
for such changes in determining damages only for personal injuries.40 A
general rule was established by Belgian legislation when Belgium in 1935
again devalued her franc; as regards damages, devaluation is to be consid-
ered only to the extent that in the pertinent field ("dans le domaine en-
visag&") the purchasing power of the franc has changed until the day of
evaluation.
4 1
Similarly the nominalistic rule is not compelling with respect to un-
liquidated claims other than damages 42 and, in some exceptional cases, not
37. Austrian Supreme Court, Assembled Senates, June I8, x924, 6 Die Rechtsprechung
z73. However, in a case where a private tutor had sold his service on the basis of the bread
price, the Supreme Court surprisingly allowed only the price as of the time of the lessons
given, despite the later depreciation of the money. Judgment of May 23, 1923, COULON, 6 MIT-
TEMUNGEN DES VERBANDES OEsTERaRsCEIscHER BANKEN UND BANKERS 250.
38. Cour de Cassation, Jan. 17, 1929 (France, 1931) 23 REVUE DE DROIT MARITImE Com-
PAL gi; Cour de Cassation, Feb. 26, 193i (932) 25 id. 75.
39. Judgments of: May 23, 1923, 1924 JUPiSTIS HE WOCHENSCiRIFT 1868; Oct. II, 1924,
1925 id. 230; Sept. I8, 1926, 1927 id. 1148; Nov. 30, i926, 1927 id. 981.
Ed. Note: Hereafter JurisTiScHE WocHaEiscianIr will be cited as J. W.
4o. Louisville & N. R. R. v. Williams, 183 Ala. x38, 62 So. 679 (1913) ; Martin v. Pacific
Gas & Elec. Co., 255 Pac. 284 (Cal. App. 1927) ; Posch v. Chicago Ry., 221 Ill. App. 24r
(1921) ; Dole v. Orleans Ry. & Light Co., I2I La. 945, 46 So. 929 (I9O8) ; Valley v. Scott,
126 Me. 597, 138 AtI. 3I (1g2). A collection of cases may be found in Notes (1919) 3
A. L. R. 61o, (I921) IO A. L. R. I79, (1922) I8 A. L. R. 564, (1929) 6o A. L. R. 1395. For
an instance where the court took account of the increased purchasing power of money, see
Johnson v. St. Paul Ry., 67 Minn. 26o, 69 N. W. 900 (897). But cf. Palmer v. Security
Trust Co., 242 Mich. 163, 218 N. W. 677 (1928), modifying a verdict by which the jury had
awarded to a wage-earner who had been seriously injured by a bus, $74,0oo damages instead
of $37,00o on the theory that the dollar had lost half its purchasing power. The court applied
the dollar-for-dollar rule, advancing the obscure reason that the halving process should have
been extended to the "wage-earned dollar" as well as to the "compensating dollar". How-
ever, the verdict was wrong inasmuch as it assumed that the wage-earner without the acci-
dent would have earned the double amount and that the then existing and actually temporary
loss in purchasing power would persist.
41. Law of April 29, 1935, BuLLETIx UsuEL DS Lots 504; see (Holland, 1935) 33 BUL-
LETIN DE L'INsTITUT INTERNATioNAL JTUDioQuE i; and MoREAu, LA CLAUSE-OR (935) 14.
Previous to the Law of 1935 it had been held that in case of devaluation damages must be
augmented in proportion to the degree of devaluation. Appellate Court of Liege, Mar. 27.
1934, 1935 PASicRISE BELGE II T48.
42. This principle has been applied under the German law to claims for recoupment of
"unjust enrichment". Reichsgericht, Oct. 4, 1926, x4 R. G. Z. 342, 344; Reichsgericht, Oct.
Ir, 1927, Ii8 . G. Z. 185, 188. The same rule was employed by the German-Belgian Mixed
Arbitral Tribunal in Delcroix v. Fritzsche & Co., 3 Recueil des Disions des Tribunaux Arbi-
traux Mixtes 291 (1923), and by the Roumanian-German Mixed Arbitral Tribunal in Di-
rection Gnrale v. Schwartz, 7 id. 738 (1923). Contra: Austrian Supreme Court, Mar. io,
1926, 8 Die Rechtsprechung 74. In rural leases cattle are frequently given to the lessee under
the agreement that at the expiration of the contract the lessee has to restore to the lessor
cattle of the same value on a total estimate set out in the contract, a deficiency to be paid in
cash (Baux A Cheptel, in German "Iron-Cattle" contracts, because an invariable stock of
cattle has to be restored). When through the inflation the nominal prices for cattle soared,
the question arose whether the cattle were to be restored only to the extent as to cover total
value prefixed under entirely different market conditions by the contract. The French Cour
de Cassation held for the lessee, extending the nominalistic principle to the prefixed valuation
and rejecting the theory of 'imprvision" (infra note 64) in its judgment of June 6, i92,
Dalloz P&iodique, 1921 I, 73, and other cases cited in.HuBRECHT, op. cit. supra note 2,
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even as to liquidated claims. The principal examples are cases of main-
tenance and kindred claims purporting to supply a definite quantity of pur-
chasing power to the obligee. Those claims may fall into the "unliquidated"
category. But even if they are liquidated by agreement of the parties,
43
they may still be open to judicial reformation where serious change in pur-
chasing power would destroy (or unreasonably raise) 44 the guaranteed
standard of living. Bequests of certain sums, too, might be subject to refor-
mation in the case of an entire depreciation of the money if such an inter-
pretation would be necessary in order to comply with the true intent of the
testator.
4
5
C. Limits of Adaptability
As suggested by the examples given, the courts will take cognizance of
only very serious changes in the purchasing power of the monetary unit.46
This qualification is applicable to all "adaptable" claims 47 including dam-
at 117 and 2 PLANIOL, TRAITA PILtMENTAn2E Du DRoiT CIVIL (rith ed. 1935) n. i82o his.
But see Italian Court of Cassation, Judgments of: Oct. 6, 1925; Sept. 26, 1925; Dec. 17, 1925;
1926 Corte de Cassazione 38, 41, 1115; also Judgment of May 12, 1927, 1927 Corte de Cas-
sazione 1272. The Reichsgericht first decided in favor of the lessor (Judgment of Feb. 13,
1920, 75 Seufferts Archly 267) ; however, the Reichsgericht on June 27, 1922, 1o4 R. G. Z.
394, decided in favor of the lessee, following the trend towards revaluation. The latter case
as well as the Italian cases led to an arbitrary handling of valuation and payments involved.
43. We do not consider liquidation by judgment. The procedural law of the forum would
come in on this score.
44. Reichsgericht, May 26, 1921, 1921 J. W. io8o; Reichsgericht, Jan. 26, I923, io6 R. G.
Z. 233. The same principle was acknowledged by the Austrian Supreme Court, April 2o, 1926,
8 Die Rechtsprechung 135, and by the Supreme Court of Czechoslovakia, see WAHLE, op. cit.
supra note 2, at 169, n. 3, although these courts are opposed to the revaluation of debts.
Adaptability, at least, of familial maintenance claims, including liquidated ones, is recognized
also by Italian writers. Ascarelli, Wiihrngsrechtliche Fragen in der italienischen Recht-
sprechung (Germany, 1928) 2 ZITSCHIrT FUR AuSLXNmISCRES UNLD INTERNATIONALEs PRI-
VATURCHT 801; ScA uTo, DEa1T1 PECUNIMU E iL DEPREZZAMENTO MoNzrAmuo (1924) 192.
Ascarelli calls the above theory "doubtless", without, however, citing decisions. Because of
the necessity of maintaining insurance reserves, life insurance debts and annuities, to be paid
by insurance companies, are business transactions which must be calculated on strict mathe-
matical principles. They are not adaptable like familial maintenance rights. Contra: Aus-
trian Supreme Court, April 20, 1926, 8 Die Rechtsprechung 135. Under German revaluation
law a partial reestablishment of life insurance claims was provided by a decree of August 28,
1924, Reichsgesetzblatt, 1924 I, 694.
45. The adjudication, of course, will depend on the circumstances. A German resident
of Switzerland who died in 1918 had bequeathed, in 1917, 50,000 marks to the University of
Heidelberg. When the mark had depreciated to one-thousandth, the Swiss Federal Tribunal,
April 26, 1923, 49 Entscheidungen des Schweizerischen Bundesgerichtes, II, 15, refused to
adapt the legacy to the new situation. Contra: Matter of Martha Lendle, 25o N. Y. 502, 166
N. E. 182 (1929). The New York Court of Appeals allowed the mark-legatee the nominal
amount in reichsmarks although the will was made in i92O when the mark had already con-
siderably depreciated. The court erroneously took the new German monetary unit, called
by the court "mark" instead of "reichsmark", for a new "reestablished" mark unaware that
mark debts had been recast into reichsmark debts at a ratio of one trillion to one. Infra note
141. The mistake cost the estate $105,355, or at least a considerable part thereof.
46. This is not true, however, where the obligation calls for the payment of a market
price of a definite commodity. The movement of the market price may reflect even minor
changes in the purchasing power of money.
47. In DAs GELD (1925), the writer suggested the term "Wertschuld" ("value-debt"),
which was adopted by the Reichsgericht, Oct. 4, 1926, 114 R. G. Z. 342. See July 5, 1918,
6 Zeilers' Aufwertungsfiille vom Reichsgericht, no. 1314; Reichsgericht, Nov. 28, 193o,
13o R. G. Z. 367. In English the term "value-debt" would probably appear out of place.
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ages. Obviously it would be highly unsound policy, even within the lim-
ited field of "adaptable" debts, to make claims mathematical "functions" of
purchasing power. A legal tie-up of important groups of claims with the
fluctuating purchasing power of money will be workable only for relatively
short emergency periods. 48 There are also political reasons which obviate
an immediate transposition of such changes into legal terms. In times of
monetary crises, it would be dangerous for courts officially to admit a de-
preciAtion of the monetary unit of the country. This may engender disas-
trous effects. In war times and in other chaotic circumstances, the question
may even become something like a national shibboleth. In 1811 when the
English bank notes were at a discount of about 15 per cent, the House of
Commons, on the motion of Mr. Vansittart, resolved that the notes "have
hitherto been, and are at this time, held in public estimation to be equivalent
to the legal coin of the realm, and generally accepted as such . . . ." Lord
Canning felt that such a pronouncement was "carrying the license of exag-
geration beyond pardonable limits, and defeating its purpose by the gross-
ness of the caricature." Yet the resolution was passed by 151 to 75.49
On the whole, therefore, it is quite understandable that thus far only
a few jurisdictions have deemed it necessary to recognize a group of "adapt-
able" debts.50 The nominalistic principle has been extended to unliquidated
debts even in countries such as France and Italy, which, after the World
War, underwent depreciations definitely reducing the monetary unit to a
fraction of its original value. And subsequently to the reestablishment of
the German currency in 1924, the Reichsgericht, ardent champion of the
general revaluation of mark debts, refused to indemnify the owner of ex-
propriated land for a loss in purchasing power of the new "reichsmark".
Germany was then on the gold standard and the court was certainly cor-
rect in asserting that if gold is the legal standard of the currency, fluctuations
of the gold value as such must not be taken into account by the courts.51
D. Executory Contracts
Hitherto we have been concerned only with the repercussion of fluc-
tuating currencies on pecuniary obligations, severing them, in the case of a
contract, from the other contractual obligations. However, in bilateral
contracts, as long as they are executory, a problem arises with regard to
48. On index clauses see Nussbaum, supra note 27, at 592.
49. For the two quotations and the vote on the resolution see SuaNEn, A HISTORY OF
AMERICAN CURRENCY (1894) 271, 278, 279 respectively, wherein these debates are summa-
rized. See also the Report of the Bullion Committee appended thereto.
5o. The notion of adaptable debts (Wertschulden) is especially objected to by HUBRECHT,
op. cit. supra note 2, at 242, for the obviously fallacious reason that "all debts are value debts".
Contra: Ascarelli, supra note 44, at 8oo.
51. Reichsgericht, Nov. 28, 1930, i3o R. G. Z. 367, depicting revaluation as an abandon-
ment of the rule "paper-mark for gold-mark" rather than of the rule "mark for mark". This
formula, though questionable, reveals the court's consciousness of the nominalistic principle.
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obligations for the future delivery of goods or services. Is the obligor
liable to performance according to the terms of the contract if, after its
formation, the currency stipulated for considerably depreciates, enhancing
at the same time wages, prices of raw material and other elements of per-
formance? The problem is particularly significant in connection with con-
struction contracts and leases obligating the lessor to supply the tenant with
gas, electricity or heat for the stipulated term. Under the nominalistic
theory, there is a duty to perform the obligation in dollars of the decreased
purchasing power. However, the situation somewhat differs from the
case of a simple debt. Imposing a loss, through depreciation, upon a money
creditor is one thing; compelling the obligor to deliver his goods or services
for a consideration which has become only a fraction of what it was before
is another thing. Courts, apart from any revaluation' doctrine, are some-
times apt to treat these two problems differently; namely, to grant relief in
the latter situation even though they refuse it in the first. For instance, in
1854, a lessee of premises in Washington, D. C., was given a ten-year option
to purchase the premises at a fixed amount. In April, 1864, when the dollar
had depreciated more than 4o per cent, the lessee exercised the option. The
United States Supreme Court, in Willard v. Tayloe 52 refused to grant him
specific performance against the lessor on the ground that it would be
"inequitable to compel a transfer of the property for notes, worth when
tendered in the market only a little more than one-half of the stipulated
price." " The Court held that the plaintiff should have tendered gold or
silver coin. Although this view certainly suggests the attitude which was
soon to be revealed in Hepburn v. Griswold,54 the line of argument and the
unanimity of the Court in Willard v. Tayloe place it beyond doubt that the
theory of the latter case is independent of the ruling on the unconstitution-
ality of the greenbacks. The reasoning of Willard v. Tayloe is not very
forceful 55 except for its broad development of an equitable specific perform-
ance doctrine. After the reversal of the Legal Tender cases, 56 Willard v.
Tayloe was pushed aside by an Ohio court. 57 Even if this be error, the
practical significance of the decision seems to be very slight, at least if dam-
ages are to be awarded to the vendee in terms of paper money. 58 Still the
case offers an interesting contribution to the legal theory of executory con-
tracts during an inflationary period.
52. 8 Wall. 557 (U. S. 1869), which is thoroughly analyzed by Dawson and Cooper,
supra note 34, at 863 et seq.
53. Willard v. Tayloe, 8 Wall. 557, 574 (U. S. 1869).
54. 8 Wall. 6o3 (U. S. 1869). See Nussbaum, The Law of the Dollar (1937) 37 CoL.
L. REV. lo84.
55. Humphrey v. Clement, 44 Ill. 299 (1867) and other cases cited by Dawson and
Cooper, supra note 34, at 866, n. i89, held to the contrary.
56. See Nussbaum, supra note 54, at 1o85.
57. Longworth v. Mitchell, 26 Ohio St. 334 (1875).
58. See supra p. 575.
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Another instance may be taken from Austrian law. In the case of an
executory sale of goods, the Austrian Supreme Court gave the seller relief
against the purchaser who, immediately after the sale, although not yet in
default, had not tendered the purchase price. The court held, on equitable
grounds, that the purchaser has to bear the subsequent depreciation. 9 How-
ever, the doctrine most often invoked in continental countries was the fre-
quently resurrected and variously renamed rule of "clausula rebus sic stan-
tibus", which had grown up in the middle ages and disappeared in the seven-
teenth and eighteen centuries. 60  According to this ancient rule, a tacit
clause was generally read into contracts to the effect that the binding effect
of the contract depends on the continuance of the basic conditions existing
at the time of contracting. This doctrine was used by the German courts
in the preliminary phase of the revaluation movement as a basis for rescis-
sion of executory contracts.6 ' It was cautiously employed in Switzerland
where it is expressly recognized by the code, in connection with "work
contracts" (e. g., construction contracts). 62 In France the rule was applied
in administrative law 63 where it was named the theory of "impr6vision"
in order to emphasize the "unforeseeability" of the events set forth as a
defense. However, suggestions by French writers for an extension of the
"impr~vision" theory to private contracts 64 were rejected by the French 65
and, after some hesitancy, by the Italian courts. 66
59. Judgment of Dec. 5, 1925, 8 Die Rechtsprechung 35.
6o. HUBRECHT, op. cit. supra note 2, at 219 et seq.; RIPRT, LA RkGLE MORALE DANS LES
OBLIGATIONS CIVILES (2d ed. 1927) n. 75 et seq.; Krfickmann, Clausula Rebus Sic Stantibus,
Kriegsklausel, Streikklausel (Germany, I918) 1i6 ARcHv FiR CIvILISTISCHE PRAXIs 157;
Osti, La Cosidetta Clausula "Rebus Sic Stantibus" nel suo Sviluppo Storico (Italy, 1912) 4
RIVISTA DI Dnanro CivmE I. For further references see 2 PLANIOr, op. Cit. supra note 42,
at n. 116S.
6I. Infra p. 579. A similar though somewhat confused doctrine was used by Polish
Courts. See PRZYBTOwSEI (Germany, 1929). 3 ZEITSCHRIFT r0iR OSTREcHT 169.
62. The Swiss Code of Obligations, art. 373 in its first paragraph provides that the con-
tractor in case his expenses or labor were greater than foreseen is not entitled to an increase
in the compensation contracted for, but art. 373, f 2 then goes on to prescribe: "If completion
is prevented or is made too difficult through extraordinary and unforeseeable events or
through events which were excluded under the presuppositions made by both parties, the
court, in its discretion, may award an augmentation of the price or rescission of the contract."
In the post-war period the rule was extended somewhat to other types of contracts in case
enforcement of the contract would result in the financial ruin of the obligor. Swiss Federal
Tribunal, July I, 1924, 50 Entscheidungen des Schweizerischen Bundesgerichtes, 1924, II, 256,
264; Oct. 9, 1927, 53 id. II, 53; April 3, 1930, 56 id. II, i89, 194 See Siegwart, Der Einfluss
veriinderter Verhldtnisse auf lanfende Vertriige in FESTGABE DER JURISTISCHEN FAcULTiT
DER. UNIVERSITXT FREIBURG ZUR 59. JAHRESVERSAMMLUNG DES SCHWEIZERISCHEN JURISTEN-
VEREINS (Switzerland, 1924). The "ruin" rule was taken from German law, infra p. 587.
63. See infra note 69.
64. Particularly by RIPERT, op. cit. supra note 6o, n. 391.
65. The leading case is Appellate Court of Paris, Dec. 21, i916, Dalloz P6riodique,
1917 II, 33. An annotation, by Professor Capitant offers a full discussion of the development
of the French law on the problem before us.
66. Italian Court of Cassation, April 7, 1923, Giurisprudenza Italiana, 1923 I, 458; Jan.
26, 1924, id. 1924 I, I56; April 26, 1926, id. 1926 I, 1128; April 30, 1926, id. 1926 I, 13O. The
Italian form for the theory rejected is "presupposizione" leaning probably on the German
"Geschdftsgrundlage", infra note 92.
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As a matter of fact, it is the function of the legislature rather than of
the judiciary to prepare emergency schemes necessary for the adjustment
of pending private contracts to changed monetary conditions. Such emer-
gency legislation, within definite limits, may, however, confer upon courts
or judicial agencies discretionary power to rescind unduly burdensome con-
tracts and to grant equitable relief to the party adversely affected by the
rescission. 67  Sometimes legislativq authorization will include power to
reform contracts and, particularly, to increase rents or other dues with an
eye to the depreciation of the currency. 68 This, then, would amount to
revaluation.
E. The Public Utilities Situation
The rates for the supply of water, gas, electricity, railway fares, and the
like, may be influenced by a depreciation of money, and generally by changes
in its purchasing power. However, the legal type of regulation to take care
of these changes varies. In Germany the regulation is considered a matter
for the executive branch of the government, particularly for the city govern-
ment, with no judicial interference whatsoever. In France, the administra-
tive courts possess jurisdiction over this subject matter. In a controversy
involving the City of Bordeaux Gas Company, the Conseil d'tat, the high-
est administrative court of France, first applied the theory of "impr6vision"
to major monetary changes, awarding the company, on account of the infla-
tionary rise of wages and prices an augmentation of its rates.69 Judicially,
this meant a reformation of a public law contract in an effort to maintain
the public service. 70
In the United States public utility rate regulation is within the province
of public service commissions, whose determinations are subject to judicial
review. 71 The courts are much concerned with protecting the rights of inves-
67. E. g., the French "Loi Failliot" of Jan. 21, igi8, Dalloz P~riodique, 1918 IV, 261,
as amended by law of May 9, 1920, id. 1920 IV, 85, regarding executory pre-war contracts.
On the highly arbitrary German legislation of 1918-1921 see NUSSBAUM, DAS DEUTSCHE
WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT (2d ed. 1922) 35. On the Italian emergency legislation SCADUTO,
DEDiTI PECUNIARI x ii DEPREZZAMENTO MoNETARIO (1924) 138 et seq. Similar Belgian legis-
lation of Oct. II, 1919, is mentioned in 2 PLANIOL, op. cit. supra note 42, at n. 1168 ter.
68. This way was chosen particularly in regard to lease contracts. As to the pertinent
French legislation see 2 PLANIOL, op. cit. supra note 42, n. 17o6 bis - 17o6 quar. On German
law see 2 STAUDINGER, KOMENTAR ZUIm BRGERLICHEN GESErzBUCH II (1928) 341, 502. All
these enactments are subject to frequent changes.
69. Judgment of March 30 , 1916, Dalloz PNriodique, 1916 III, 25. Other cases are
cited in 6 RIPRT AND PLANIOL, TRAITL PRATIQUE DU DROIT CIvIL (1930) 548, n. 1.
70. In Italy revision of prices in contracts for public work was set by decree of July 21,
x927, n. 1316, 1927 RACCOLTA UFFICIALE III 3386, transformed into statute by law of June 14,
1928, n. 1575, 1928 RACCOLTA UFFICIALE III 2594.
71. The power of the boards was upheld as valid delegation of legislative power. Stone
v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co., 116 U. S. 307 (1886). The due process clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment served as a basis for judicial interference. Chicago, Milwaukee & St
Paul Ry. v. Minnesota, 134 U. S. 418, 458 (189o); Reagan v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co.,
154 U. S. 362 (1894) ; St. Louis & San Francisco Ry. v. Gill, 156 U. S. 649 (1895).
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tors from what the courts call confiscation.7 2  In 1898, when the leading
case of Smyth v. Ames 73 was decided by the Supreme Court, prices, due
to the prolonged after effects of the panic of 1893, were considerably below
the level of the preceding decades when most of the utilities were built. The
public, therefore, urged that the reproduction cost rather than the higher
original cost of construction be taken as the basis of rate regulation. The
Court held that the basis for computing rates to be charged by the utility
"must be the fair value of the property being used by it for the convenience
of the public", a theory commonly referred to as a "fair return on a fair
value". As to "fair value", the Court pointed out that the original cost of
construction, the amount expended in improvements, "the present as com-
pared with the original cost of construction . . . are all matter for consider-
ation." This formula, an attempt to reconcile both the demands of the
public and those of the utilities, left a broad leeway to the public service
commissions. When in the following years prices rose, driving reproductibn
cost above original cost, the commissions began to take recourse to original
cost, abandoning the reproduction cost theory with its hypothetical esti-
mates.7 4  This procedure, however, was held unconstitutional in South-
western Bell Telephone Co. v. Missouri Public Service Commission." The
"reproduction cost" element had thus become prevalent; but since this prac-
tice was retained after a higher purchasing power of the dollar was re-
stored76 it now operated toward giving the public utilities a smaller rate
base. The doctrine, thus established, results in subjecting the public utilities,
as to their rate bases, to the effects of the fluctuating purchasing power of
the dollar, with a view to securing to them a certain stability in terms of
purchasing power.7 7  In this connection, the use of index numbers in trans-
lating the purchasing power of the dollar of one year into that of another
72. See Hale, What is a "Confiscatory" Rate (1935) 35 CoL. L. REV. 1045. For a more
general discussion see BAUER, THE EFFECTIVE REGULATION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES (1925);
GRAHAM, PUBLIC UTILITY VALUATION (1934) (with ample references); JONES & BIGHAM,
PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITIES (1932); MOSHER & CRAWFoRD, PUBLIC UTILITY REGULA-
TION (1933).
73. 169 U. S. 466 (1898).
74. Denver v. Denver Union Water Co., 246 U. S. 178 (1918) ; Consolidated Gas Co. v.
Newton, 267 Fed. 231 (S. D. N. Y. 1920).
75. 262 U. S. 276 (1923).
76. Bluefield Water Works v. West Virginia Pub. Serv. Comm., 262 U. S. 679 (1923);
McCardle v. Indianapolis Water Co., 272 U. S. 400 (1926) ; Gilchrist v. Interborough Rapid
Transit Co., 279 U. S. 159 (1929). See also cases cited, during the depression following the
1929 disaster, in Lilienthal, Regulation of Public Utilities During the Depression (1933) 46
HARV. L. REv. 745.
77. In Consolidated Gas Co. v. Newton, 267 Fed. 231, 257 (S. D. N. Y. 1920), Learned
Hand, J., describes at some length how the reproduction cost rule by hitching up the public
utility rates with the general price level protects the utilities against changes in the monetary
value. See also Goddard, The Interest of Public Utility Ratepayers in Depreciation (935)
48 HAmv. L. REV. 721; Herrman, Public Utility Valuation and the Depreciated Dollar (1935)
5 JOHN MARSHALL L. Q. 17; Note (1932) 17 MARQ. L. REv. 141. Under the former state
railway regulation it had been held that a two-cent fare awarded by state law refers, in the
case of dollar depreciation, to the depreciated money. Lewis v. New York Central Ry., 49
Barb. 330 (N. Y. 1867).
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has found favor with commissions, courts and advocates of the reproduction
cost as a convenient means for avoiding the cost and delay of other methods.
78
The purchasing power of the dollar has thereby become a significant factor in
the law of public utilities, constituting probably the most important instance
of the legal use of the purchasing-power concept.
As to the "fair return", the rule was established by the Supreme Court
that "a public utility is entitled to such rates as will permit it to earn a return
on the value of the property which it employs for the convenience of the
public equal to that generally being made at the same time and in the same
general part of the country on investments in other business undertakings
which are attended by corresponding risks and uncertainties; but it has no
constitutional right to profits such as are realized or anticipated in highly
profitable enterprises or speculative ventures." 79 This return obviously
will depend rather on the capital market than on the money market.
II. REVALUATION1 IN GERMANY
A. General Remarks: Preliminary Phases
"The depreciation of the mark of 1914-23," says the London economist,
Professor Robbins, "is one of the outstanding episodes in the history of
the twentieth century. Not only by reason of its magnitude but also by reason
of its effects, it looms large on our horizon. It was the most colossal thing
of its kind in history; and next to the Great War itself, it must bear respon-
sibility, for many of the political and economic difficulties of our generation.
It destroyed the wealth of the more solid elements in German society, and
it left behind a moral and economic disequilibrium, apt breeding ground for
the disasters which have followed." 80
Such is indeed the background against which the "revaluation" (Auf-
wertung) of the destroyed mark debts has to be viewed. True, revaluation
which may be broadly defined as restoration, entire or partial, of debts
78. In Indianapolis Water Co. v. McCart, 89 F. (2d) 522 (C. C. A. 7th, 1937), aff'd, 58
Sup. Ct. 324 (1938), the Wholesale Commodities Price Index of the U. S. Department of
Labor in addition to a private index referred to by the parties was used by the Court prac-
tically to award the water works a 2S%, increase in the rate base as of Nov. 1935 over the
rate base as of April I, 1933. On the other hand the use of index-numbers was discouraged
by West v. Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Co., 295 U. S. 662, 669 (1935). A state
commission had started from original cost and translated them into an amount of equal pur-
chasing power as of the time of the decree by means of price indices. For this purpose the
commission had selected sixteen commodity price indices, had weighed them and derived from
them a "fair value" index which was applied to the original cost. This very elaborate and
careful proceeding was held unconstitutional by a divided court, partly because the reasons
for weighing the indices had not been disclosed by the court. The dissenting opinion, with
which Justices Brandeis and Cardozo concurred was written by Justice Stone. See also
GRAHAM, op. cit. supra note 72, at 21; Dorety, The Function of Reproduction Cost in Public
Utility Valuation and Rate Making (1923) 37 HARv. L. REv. 173, 190-191. Courts may resort
to official index numbers only if they are introduced in evidence, except perhaps for the state-
ment on general price tends. Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Util. Comm., 301 U. S. 292 (1936).
79. Bluefield Water Works v. West Va. Pub. Serv. Comm., 262 U. S. 679, 692 (1923).
8o. See preface to BRESClANi-TuRRNI, op. cit. supra note 31.
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impaired by monetary depreciation has a history that goes back for centu-
ries.8 ' Still, legal and economic sciences have not been aware of this funda-
mental concept and its implications until the German post-war revaluation.
Being an elementary reaction against the most pernicious inflationary process
the world has ever seen, it is in itself an event of historical grandeur, prob-
ably the greatest which ever occurred in terms of the law of contracts. Any
discussion, legal or economic, directed towards the development of theoreti-
cal views on revaluation, is bound to envisage the German events.
8 2
The inflationary movement began during the war; in June, 1918, the
dollar (parity 4.21 marks) had reached a level of 5.31 and by November,
1918, it was 7.43.83 In December, 1919, the dollar was quoted at 46.77;
in December, 192o, at 73; in December, 1921, at 191; in July, 1922, at
493; in October, 1922, at 318o; in December, 1922, at 7589. On January
II, 1923, French and Belgian troops occupied the Ruhr territory, center
of Germany's heavy industry, in pursuance of Mr. Poincair6's policy of
"productive pledges". At once a monetary tornado broke out: dollar quo-
tations averaged in January, 1923, 17,972; in February, 27,918; in March,
2I,I9O; in April, 24,457; in May, 47,670; in June, 1O9,996; in July, 353,412.
Then the dollar quotations soared to astronomical heights: 4.6 millions
in August; 150 millions on September 18; 1.2 billion on October 9; 12
billions on October i; the trillion limit was attained on November 14; on
November 15 the newly created Rentenbank circulated the "Rentenmark"
to be tied up to the dollar, but it was at once caught in the tempest. On
November 23 the level of 4.2 trillions was reached; but the government in a
last effort kept quotations of the dollar down to this level; it did not loosen
its grip; suddenly the tornado subsided,84 followed by the murderous calm
of strangling deflation. 85
81. Supra p. 572.
82. For information see commentators on the revaluation law, cited supra note 141. The
only analytical history of the revaluation movement and a valuable one has been written by
an American. Dawson, Effects of Inflation on Private Contracts: Germany, 1914-1924
(934) 33 MICH. L. Rv. 171. For a critical interpretation of the revaluation movement see
KLANG, GELDENTWERTUNG UND JURISTISCHE METHODE (1925); NUSSBAUM, BILANZ DER
AUFWERTUNGSTHEORIE (1927). Annual reports, concerning'cases and writings, are to be
found, since 1924, in JAHRBUCH DES DEUTSCHEN RECHTS. Ample literary material, on the
whole without any lasting interest, is collected in 2 STAuDINGEI, KOmmExTA ZUm BftGER-
LICHEN GEsETzuECH (i930) 49, 55, 59.
83. The most detailed tables of the depreciation of the mark in terms of foreign cur-
rencies are the VALUTA-TABELLEN 1914-1927 (Frankdurter Societits-Druckerei, 1927). Sta-
tistical material as to the depredation of the mark is contained in BREsCIANr-TURoNI, op. cit.
supra note 31; ELSTER, VON DER MARK ZUR REIcHsmAn (1928) (dollar quotations at p.
433); GRAiAmr, EXCHANGE, PRICES, AND PRODUCTION IN HYPER-I.LATIoN GERMANY 1920-
1923 (1930). The dollar quotations do not exactly reflect the purchasing power of the mark,
which after the war exceeded the respective dollar value. However, the dollar movement
roughly gives a true picture of the mark development, and it was of the greatest psychological
significance. It was followed tensely and apprehensively by practically the whole populace.
84. As to the history of the critical days see BAUMGARTNER, LE RENTENmARK (2d ed.
1925) ; ELSTER, op. cit. supra note 83, at 215 et seq.; GRAHAM, op. cit. supra note 83;
SCHACHT, STABILIZATION OF THE MARK (927) 90.
85. See BREscrArN-TuRoNr, op. cit. supra note 31, at 359.
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Judicial counter-movement to this havoc started from the field of
pre-war executory contracts. It set in as early as the war under the pressure
of the Allied Powers' blockade. When sellers of foreign material or of
goods containing such material refused delivery alleging impossibility of
performance, the question arose as to whether there was really an "impossi-
bility" or merely a temporary hindrance of performance. The Reichsgericht
held for the sellers on the ground that inability to send the material through
the blockade was to be treated in law as a permanent impediment, considering
its long duration and the uncertainty--extreme indeed--of its termination."8
This doctrine, very cautiously qualified by the court,8 7 constituted merely
an application of well settled rules, and was subjected to adverse criticism
only in respect to the formula subsidiarily employed by the court, according
to which the performance promised (e. g., the delivery of copper wire) had
become, by force of events, an "economically different" one. 8
This subsidiary formula, however, paved the way for the next phase
of the development. There was submitted to the iReichsgericht a contract
made in August, 1916, providing for the construction of a tug-boat to be
delivered not earlier than fourteen months after the conclusion of peace.
The constructor alleged that performance would drive him into bankruptcy
since the expenditure for material and wages would triple the contractual
price. No pre-war contract blockade, no nationalization of material could
be pleaded in this case. The court, however, on December 2, 1919, in finding
for the constructor, pointed out that under the alleged conditions the per-
formances demanded would be essentially different from the performances
contracted for.89 This was still a reasoning in terms of impossibility. How-
ever, it was in fact the "clausula-rebus-sic-stantibus" doctrine 90 which was
the basis for the decision. Before long the court, under the pressure of in-
creasing economic troubles, proceeded outspokenly to resort to the "clausula"
doctrine, which it had previously rejected as contrary to German law,91
rather than to an "impossibility-of-performance" theory. The term "claus-
ula-rebus-sic-stantibus" later disappeared; but there still remained the doc-
trine under which the seller (entrepreneur, constructor, etc.) was entitled to
rescind the contract if, subsequent to the time of contracting, the original
financial "equivalence" between his performance and the consideration prom-
ised was, by the enhancement of prices, destroyed to such an extent that
86. Reichsgericht, Feb. 4, igi6, 88 R. G. Z. 72; Reichsgericht, March 27, 1917, 9o R. G.
Z. 1O2; Reichsgericht, Oct. 15, 1918, 94 R. G. Z. 46.
87. Reichsgericht, March 21, igi6, 88 R. G. Z. 172; Reichsgericht, Jan. 22, 1918, 92 R.
G. Z. 87; Reichsgericht, March 15, IgI8, 92 R. G. Z. 322.
88. See the cases cited supra note 86.
89. Reichsgericht, Dec. 2, 1919, 98 R. G. Z. 18.
go. Supra p. 581.
91. Reichsgericht, Sept. 21, 1920, IOO R. G. Z. 129; Reichsgericht, Feb. 3, 1922, 103 R.
G. Z. 328.
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insisting upon performance would appear unfair.92  This proposition was
derived from the broad rule of the Civil Code [§ 242] according to which
the debtor "is under a duty to carry out his performance as required in good
faith taking into account ordinary usage" ["wie Treu and Glauben mit
Rucksicht auf die Verkehrsitte es erfordern"]. The court, however, still
made relief depend on the fact that maintenance of the contract would lead
to the financial ruin of the obligor,93 thus preserving a relic of the impossi-
bility doctrine. Finally this qualification was abandoned.9 4  The result in
1923 was that in executory contracts the seller (or any other party obligated
to deliver goods or services) was held entitled to rescind the contract because
of a radical change in the market. This was not an absolute rule, however,
but was qualified by a weighing of the surrounding circumstances from
the angle of "good faith".9 5  Generally the right of rescission was condi-
tioned upon the vendor's offering the vendee an opportunity to concede a
reasonable augmentation of the price in order to avert rescission.9 But
there was, in these preliminary phases, no direct compulsion upon the vendee
to pay more than the sum promised by him; hence there was no revaluation
proper.9 7
B. Judicial Revaluation
The deathblow inflicted upon the mark br the Ruhr invasion led to the
finale of the monetary catastrophe. Debts worth millions and more had
evaporated. Adhering to holdings of lower courts the Fifth Civil Senate
of the Reichsgericht, through the epochal judgment of November 28, 1923,
concerning an ordinary mortgage debt rather than an executory contract,
ordered revaluation of debts.98 Previously the Fifth Senate, by a proceed-
ing not provided for by law, had procured the consent of the other Civil
92. Reichsgericht, Feb. 3, 1922, 1O3 R. G. Z. 328; Reichsgericht, Jan. 6, 1923, io6 R. G.
Z. 7. The doctrinal basis of the theory of the Court had been prepared in legal writing, par-
ticularly by Krfickmann, supra note 6o, at 157, and OERTMANN, DIE GaSCHAFTSGRUNDLAGE
(1921).
93. See Reichsgericht, April 16, 1921, 102 M. G. Z. 98, Ioo, citing precedents.
94. Reichsgericht, Feb. 3, 1922, 1O3 R. G. Z. 328; Reichsgericht, March 24, 1922, 104
R. G. Z. 218.
95. Reichsgericht, June 7, 192i, 102 R. G. Z. 272.
96. Reichsgericht, Feb. 3, 1922, 103 R. G. Z. 333; Sept. 22, 1923, 1923 J. W. 984.
97. In case the vendee should wish to carry on the contract, the court was authorized to
determine a reasonable price binding upon the parties. Reichsgericht, Sept. 21, 192o, 1oo R.
G. Z. 129. In Reichsgericht, Nov. IO, 1923, 107 R. G. Z. 151, which presented very special
circumstances, determination, by the lower court, of a reasonable rent for an elapsed period
was approved. Contrary to Dawson, supra note 82, at 207, the decision of the Reichsgericht,
Sept. 22, 1923, 1923 J. W. 984, does not hold that the lower courts were free to fix a reason-
able rate and to refuse rescission, in the case of non-acceptance. The first two cases reveal
the inevitable arbitrariness in the determination of the reasonable price (rent). Considera-
tion by the court of the lessened purchasing power of the mark, in the case of damages and
other "adaptable!' claims likewise developed within this period, but this was no preliminary
phase of revaluation. Supra p. 575.
98. Since a mortgage was involved the court ostensibly confined its judgment to mort-
gages, but under the theory announced this reservation had no practical significance.
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Senates.9 9 It was again the conception of "good faith" to which the court
resorted; 100 and it was given preference over the legal tender rules. These
rules having broken down, there was no longer any bar to the crushing
superiority of the good faith principle. Previous payments, in depreciated
money, were held not to have discharged the debt.10 1 This led, on a tre-
mendous scale, to a revival of debts paid off and receipted; and this process
was pushed on, with great force, to an overriding of waivers, 10 2 of rec-
ognized account balances, 10 3 of compromises, 10 4 of statutes of limitations, 10 5
and of judgments.' 0 6 In the name of "good faith", retroactivity was driven
back through the past down to 1920.107 Thus in addition to all of the ex-
isting debts, past debts likewise became the subject of controversy between
creditor and debtor with no direction for settlement. For there was no guid-
ance except the broad announcement that the solution of the controversy
had to conform to good faith. Revaluation was not carried out by the Ger-
man courts along lines comparable to the Anglo-American equity law, that
is, through distinct equitable rules of law; the Reichsgericht, acting con-
sistently under the theory adopted, urged upon the lower courts the view
that "revaluation is not a legally determined distinct concept" ("kein recht-
lich bestimmter Begriff") 108 and that the solution had to be sought by the
99. OERTMANN, DiE AUFwERTUNGSFRAGE BEI GELDFORDERUNGEN, HYPOTEEKEN UND
ANLEIHEN (1924) 40.
ioo. This was the basis of the opinion which in many words offered little substance, and
it was the only ground finally adhered to in the course of further development. The court,
however, in this first judgment advanced also a "supplementary interpretation" of the intent
of the parties who the court points out, would have decided for revaluation in case they had
foreseen the depreciation of the mark. This puzzling argument getting out of the intent of
the parties what the court had put in before was later abandoned by the court as was the
reference to § 607 of the Civil Code. HECK, 122 ARcHly Fi DiE CIVmIsTiscHE PRAxis (Ger-
many, 1924) 203, 208, remarks that the court did not mention its previous decisions, contrary
to the new doctrine, nor pay attention to the public interest involved in the legal tender acts.
The question whether revaluation was warranted by the currency situation was not touched
upon by the court.
ioi. Reichsgericht, March 13, 1925, i1O R. G. Z. 65, 78; Dec. 3, 1924, 1925 J. W. 45, and
numerous other cases referred to in 2 STAUDINGER, op. cit. supra note 82, at 64.
1O2. Reichsgericht, May 7, 1927, II6 R. G. Z. 313; Reichsgericht, June ii, 1927, 117 R.
G. Z. 226.
103. Reichsgerlcht, Oct. 30, 1928, 122 R. G. Z. 200, 206.
1O4. Reichsgericht, June 1I, 1927, 117 R. G. Z. 226.
105. Reichsgericht, June 22, 1925, II R. G. Z. 147; Judgment of Nov. 1o, 1926, 1927 J.
W. 983, n. 17.
io6. Reichsgericht, Dec. 15, 1928, 123 R. G. Z. 32, giving references. Administrative
decisions were likewise exploded. Reichsgericht, Oct. 24, 1928, 122 R. G. Z. 167.
lo7. Relchsgericht, Jan. 16, 1926, 112 R. G. Z. 324; May 25, 1927, 1927 J. W. 1853, n.
33, giving references; Nov. 22, 1927, 1928 J. W. 494 (condemnation damages paid in 1919)
and Dec. 15, 1927, 1928 J. W. 158. (The judgment of Nov. 22, 1927 shows that retroaction
was extended to "adaptable" debts.) At one time the Second Civil Senate of the Reichsge-
richt made a desperate effort to dam up the flood by setting up August 15, 1922 as a back-
ward limit to retroaction, but this arbitrary demarcation was not approved by the other Sen-
ates and was finally abandoned by the Second Senate. So arbitrariness as to retroaction was
reestablished, creative of thousands, perhaps hundreds of thousands of controversies. See
NUSSBAum, BILANZ DER AU FWERTUNGSTHEORIE (1929) 24 et seq.; Dawson, supra note 82,
at 235 et seq.
io8. Thus, the important decree of the Assembled Senates (Plenarbeschluss) of May 31,
1925, io R. G. Z. 377. "Objections" (against giving revaluation beyond dollar parity), the
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judge exclusively with an eye to the individual circumstances of the ease,
considering "all of the interests" of the parties, 09 all of the ascertainable
facts.' 10 On this swampy ground not only the "if" but also the "how
much" of revaluation were to be determined. Sometimes the fact that the
price had depreciated to a half or to a quarter of its former value at the
time of contracting was held a sufficient justification for revaluation; :11
but this would not hold good in other cases."' As to the amount to be
awarded, the Reichsgericht categorically refused to set up any standard.
The lower courts were told to use, in their discretion, singly or in combina-
tion, chiefly or subsidiarily, the dollar value,"13 the index of living cost, and
of wholesale prices," 4 the market prices of individual goods, 11 or a special
index elaborated by a member of the Reichsgericht (Zeiler) ; zx but none
of these measures were to be conclusive. 117 Among other facts the financial
situation of the parties were to be considered, under the theory that the
impecunious debtor should pay less than the moneyed debtor, and that the
wealthy creditor should not be treated as favorably as the poor one." 8s For
this purpose the financial conditions of the parties had to be envisaged not
only with respect to the end of the inflationary period, but also with respect
to the subsequent financial fate of the parties."19 Thus the parties in ordi-
nary debt litigation were compelled to disclose their financial status and its
vicissitudes. To all of these difficulties of a more factual kind were added
almost insoluble juridical problems. These originated chiefly in the con-
flicts of law field,' 20 in the necessity of giving the owner of mortgaged real
court said, "cannot be derived from the concept of revaluation, since revaluation is no legally
distinct concept at all." A remarkable confession. In Kornatzki v. Oppenheimer, 4 All Eng.
Rep. 133 (K. B. 1937), the court felt that German revaluation was a question of "fact" rather
than of "discretion". However, revaluation has invariably been the subject of decisions of
the Reichsgericht, which only decides questions of law.
og. Reichsgericht, Nov. 28, 1923, 1O7 R. G. Z. 78; resolution of the Assembled Senates
in preceding note.
nio. Reichsgericht, Feb. 21, 1924, io8 R. G. Z. 83.
iii. Judgment of Oct. 25, 1927, 1928 J. W. i5g, n. ii; Dec. 6, 1927, 1928 J. W. 1384;
January I6, 1928, 1928 J. W. I800.
112. According to judgment of Jan. 5, 1925, 1925 J. W. 467, revaluation would have to
take place where "the stipulated sum of paper-money, compared with the value of the consid-
eration received, either is devoid of significance or is of minimum economic value."
113. Reichsgericht, Oct. 13, 1925, 111 R. G. Z. 375.
114. Judgment of Feb. 8, 1924, 1924 J. W. 804; Reichsgericht, Nov. 12, 1924, io9 R. G. Z.
158; Assembled Senates, May 31, 1925, iio R. G. Z. 379.
I15. Judgment of Jan. 26, 1928, 1928 J. W. 1801.
zx6. Assembled Senates of May 31, 1925, 11O R. G. Z. 379.
i17. This has frequently been pointed out. See, e. g., Assembled Senates, March 31,
1925, i1O R. G. Z. 379; Reichsgericht, Feb. I8, 1927, 115 R. G. Z. 2O, 2o4; June 29, 1926,
1926 J. W. 2619, n. 3; Jan. i6, 1928, 1928 J. W. 18oo.
118. Ordinarily financial conditions of the debtor were taken into account, but on prin-
ciple, the situation of the creditor was to be considered. See, e. g., Reichsgericht, May 7,
1927, 116 R. G. Z. 313, 317; Dec. 15, 1927, 1928 J. W. 158; April 14, 1928, 1928 J. W. 1819.
11g. Reichsgericht, Jan. 15, 1929, 123 R. G. Z. 371 ; Sept. 22, 1928, 1929 J. W. 664.
12o. To be discussed in the author's forthcoming volume.
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estate recourse against his predecessor upon revaluation of the mortgage, 121
and finally in the attempts of the Reichsgericht to curtail litigation by the
development of an estoppel ("Verwirkungs") doctrine of an entirely novel
type. 1 22  Stipulations in contracts would sometimes be found to the effect
that parties subjected themselves to a foreign jurisdiction "in order to escape
revaluation." 123
Some figures may illustrate what has been said. The Prussian Min-
ister of Finance mentioned in his budget report of 1926 that as a result of
revaluation more than three thousand officials, permanent and auxiliary, had
to be appointed to the Prussian courts.124 A figure of five thousand for all
of Germany is probably not an exaggeration. Litigation, as if it were
imitating depreciation, rose to millions.12 5 Three reporter systems were
created for revaluation cases alone; 126 the Reichsgericht itself rendered con-
siderably more than two thousand judgments on revaluation 12 7 during a
period of about ten years.'-2  Nearly half of them reversed the decisions of
121. On the implications of this so-called "Ausgleichanspruch" (indemnification claim)
of the owner see 2 STAUDINGER, op. cit. supra note 82, part 3, at 1668, and the succinct
discussion of Flad in 1929 JURISTIScHE RUNDSCHAU 204.
122. The creditor was held excluded from retroactive revaluation unless he had demanded
it within a reasonable time after the retroaction-ruling had become generally known. This
had happened, according to various judgments, in 1924 or in 1925 or in 1926 or in 1927. 2
STAUDINGER, op. cit. supra note 82, at 656; NussBAum, op. cit. supra note 1O7, at 39.
123. Reichsgericht, May 16, 1926, 1926 J. W. 1336. The contract was between a German
and a foreigner, but the court acknowledged that the German party also might have had an
interest to exclude revaluation.
124. Among those appointees there must have been considerably more than a thousand
judges. The "revaluation departments" (see infra note 125) alone were tenanted, on May i,
1927, by 849 judges which number was reduced, on Jan. I, 1928, to 442.
125. Special revaluation departments (Aufwertungsstellen) were instituted with the
lower courts of general jurisdiction (Amtsgericht). Revaluation Law of July 6, 1925, 1925
REICHSGESETZBLA'r" I 117, 130, § 69 et seq.
They had to adjudicate in a summary proceeding certain controversies turning on the
amount and other terms of statutory revaluation. Their main business consisted in adjudicat-
ing motions for individual reduction or augmentation of the 2 %7 standard revaluation of
mortgages and, later on, in adjudicating motions of mortgagors for the granting of a mora-
torium. On January 2o, 1928, 2,864,217 cases had been brought before the Prussian revalua-
tion departments, 2,773,595 of which were then disposed of, a tremendous achievement of the
Prussian judicial bureaucracy. In Bavaria, on December 31, 1927, 98.If%. of the revaluation-
department cases, totalling 522,656 had been disposed of. NuSSAUM, op. cit. supra note io7,
at 17. Ordinary lawsuits on revaluation, particularly those involving "free revaluation" were
dealt with by the ordinary law courts. There are no statistics thereon, but it is certain that
these proceedings which engrossed the courts up to 1932 and even later were the most stirring
and burdensome part of the revaluation business. See infra note 127.
126. Die Rechtsprechung in Aufwertungssachen; Die Aufwertungsprais; Aufwertungs-
fille beim Reichsgericht (edited by Zeiler, member of the Reichsgericht, II volumes). There
were, in addition, an Aufwertungs-Kartei using a loose-card system and a more popular
weekly, Die Aufwertung.
127. In Zeiler's reports there were collected under 2327 divisions about 2ooo revaluation
judgments of the Reichsgericht up to 193o inclusive. The reports were then discontinued.
128. The number of revaluation cases decided in 1932 was still considerable, see JAHa-
BUCH DES DEUTSCHEN REcHTS for the year 1932, 313 (1933). There are even pertinent cases
in the JAHRBUCH for 1936, at 376; however, the figures since 1933 are no longer comparable,
considering the formidable decline of judicial litigation since the establishment of the national-
socialist government (a fact, which cannot be developed here, although of greatest interest in
political science).
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the lower appellate courts, thus reflecting the complete bewilderment of the
judiciary.' 29
It would be difficult to find in the legal history of the great countries of
western civilization a similar instance of such thoroughgoing judicial aber-
ration and confusion. A prominent German lawyer, at the 1925 meeting of
the German Lawyers Association, accurately characterized the situation
when "with the tumultuous applause of the audience" he exclaimed, that "the
courts, under the revaluation doctrine, are running into the danger of be-
coming institutions to distribute the goods of life under ethical points of
view." 130 And the Supreme Court of Austria, in rejecting judicial revalu-
ation, stated that its effect consists in making the personal notions of the
court on equity and on the most intricate general conditions the law of the
land, and that the courts thereby would "lose the ground under their feet." 131
Still the Reichsgericht was fortunate in a very important aspect. Obvi-
ously revaluation presupposes a previous currency reorganization and a
restoration of stable money. As mentioned above the new rentenmark
was issued not earlier than November 15, 1923, and the stabilization level
was attained on November 23. But the extreme uncertainty as to the suc-
cess of the stabilization persisted for several months,132 as reflected by un-
heard of interest rates. 33 On November 28 when the Reichsgericht handed
down its sentence, the soil still trembled, ready to open once again as at the
time when the "assignats" of the French Revolution were replaced by the
"mandats territoriaux". 134 The imminent danger and the stabilization
problem in general apparently were not taken into account by the court,
which never mentioned these points; obviously the court, after deliberations
which must have begun a considerable time before November 23,'3 5 had
made up its mind to start revaluation regardless of any stabilization as it
had been done in some lower courts. 136
129. ZELmER, AUFWERTUNGSr.ALLE Vom REICHSGERICHT (193I) (preface to vol. ii).
130. 1926 J. W. 232, annex p. 14 (Address of Mr. Hoeck of Hamburg). German writers
opposed to the doctrine of the Reichsgericht are listed in NUSSBAUM, op. cit. supra note 1O7.
131. Judgment of March 12, 1930, 193o Die Rechtsprechung 105, referring to the objec-
tions to judicial revaluation raised by NUSSBAUm, DAS GELD (1925) 125.
132. See SCHACHT, op. cit. supra note 84, at 151.
Sept. I8, 1929, 1929 J. W. 3480: 6%. daily from Nov. 2, 1923, until Dec. IO, 1923; I% daily
from Dec. ii until Dec. 31, 1933; 3o% annually from Jan. I until June 30, 1934; 24% annually
from July until Sept. 3o, 1924; I8% from Oct. I until Dec. 31, 1934; 12%. for 1925. Gen-
erally the customary interest rate was indicated as io%. daily from Nov. 15 until Nov. 30,
1923; 6 and later 2 or 3% daily to Dec. 31, 1923; f% daily from Jan. 1924. Reichsgericht,
Feb. IO, 1927, 27 BANKARCHIV (1928) 276; Jan. 30, 1929, 28 BANIKARCHIV (1929) 280. See
also BRESCIANI-Tu1oNI, op. cit. supra note 31, at 360.
133. The following rates were held reasonable and "very moderate" by the Reichsgericht,
134. See HARGREAVES, RESTORING CURRENCY STANDARDS (1926) 34.
135. Considering the previous negotiations by the Fifth Civil Senate with the other Sen-
ates, supra at n. 99.
136. Particularly by the Court of Darmstadt, March 29, 1923, and May I8, 1923, 1923 J.
W. 459, 552.
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C. Statutory Revaluation
The course of the Reichsgericht placed the German government in a
serious situation. The government was aware that, during the Ruhr inva-
sion and the inflation, there was no chance for legislative revaluation. Its
proper place would have been a carefully defined "recasting" rule in a law
creating a new and stable currency. However, through the proceeding of
the court, a sweeping and economically inconsiderate policy was going to be
forced upon the country, which was to become, in addition to other trou-
bles, a judicial battleground. Obviously, legislation had to counteract. How-
ever, when it became known that the government intended to take counter-
measures, the board of the "Association of the Judges at the Reichsgericht"
on January 8, 1924, publicly protested with a remarkable declaration.
13T
Astonishment, 138 the high justices declared, was raised within the Reichs-
gericht by the views of the intended legislation. The "good faith" principle
on which the decision of November 28, 1923, rests, the declaration asserted,
was superior to any "individual statutory rule". The judges warned the
government that future reliance on the planned legislative measures might
be rejected by the court as a violation of good faith, and that possibly such
legislation in itself might be considered as a violation of good faith, as
"immoral", and as unconstitutional, even if the government should forbid
revaluation only partially. The court's feeling of responsibility as revealed
by the judgment of November 28, 1923,-39 was contrasted by the justices
with the apparent moral insensibility of the government and the apprehen-
sion of the declarants that the government might yield to powerful and
"selfish" interests.
The declaration is all the more impressive in view of the fact that
the German judiciary has always been subordinate to the legislature. In a
long and bitter struggle, the epoch of liberalism had secured to the courts
independence from the commands of the monarch. However, subordination
of the judiciary to legislation had evolved as a well-settled rule, constitutional
under the constitutions of the several states and actually followed without
137. 1924 Deutsche Richterzeitung 7; 1924 J. W. go. The association was of a private
nature, yet doubtless representative of the body of the Reichsgericht's judiciary. No objection
to the declaration which was signed by Mr. Lobe, President of a Senate of the Reichsgericht,
was ever voiced by a member of the court. On January I, 1925, President Lobe published
an article, passing strictures upon the government, under the suggestive title Der Untergang
des Rechtstaates (Decay of the Government by Law) (Germany, 1925) DEUTSCHE JURIS-
TENZEITUNG 15. However, it was certainly not the democratic government which wrought
the end of the government by law; on the contrary, never in German history were the func-
tions and authority of the courts so extended as they were by this government. The entire
misappreciation by the high judge of real conditions reveals his bias and passion, and it is
important to note that a similar mental attitude prevailed within the judiciary and the non-
judicial bureaucracy.
138. This is translation of "Befremden" which, however, has a connotation of reserved
blame not exactly translatable.
139. See, however, supra note ioo.
DEBTS UNDER INFLATION
hesitation. There was neither a Chief Justice Marshall nor a due-process
clause. On the other hand, the democratic German government of 1924
possessed little authority. Arisen from defeat and revolution, and inces-
santly humiliated by foreign powers, formers of world opinion, it failed to
impress very much the justices who were educated in the proud tradition
of centuries-old and monarchic bureaucracy. They were hardly convinced
of the continuity and, perhaps, of the legitimacy of German democratic
government.1 40 At the same time this government, by virtue of its principles,
not only refrained from infringements upon the personnel of the court but
also felt bound to impart much significance to the voice of judicial authority.
Certainly it did not plainly and simply surrender in face of the threatening
declaration of the judges; on the other hand, it did not dare to encroach
upon the principle of judicial revaluation, henceforth by legislation called
"free" revaluation because it was not put under any definite limits as was
"statutory" revaluation. Statutory revaluation was confined, by various
enactments and decrees,141 to investments which comprised particularly mort-
gages (revaluation rate 25 per cent); mortgage bonds, life insurance and
savings bank accounts were revalued, by appropriate proceedings, to the
extent of the reserves held by the debtors for the protection of such right-
holders. 142  As to mortgages, by far the most important revaluation item,1 43
14o. Recently a national-socialist writer, FRANZEN, GESETZ UND RICHTER NACH DEN
GRUNDS.TZEN DES NATIONALSOZiALISTISCHEN STAATES (1935) 33 states that the course of the
Reichsgericht was brought about by the Court's "distrust of democratic legislation." He
exclaims, however, that "such attempts of courts to correct the legislature, are incompatible
with the principles of a national-socialistic Fiihrer-state I" (Exclamation point by Mr. Fran-
zen.) On the other hand, Prof. Pergament of Leningrad in (Germany, 1930) ZETSCrR= FU-R
OSTRECHT 87, hails the "revolutionary" proceeding of the Reichsgericht, revolution being the
ultimate remedy against unjust and oppressive legislation. But this is probably not the
Russian government's theory of the functions of the judiciary. The political science problem
involved is ably discussed by DEssAuER, REcHT, RIcHTERTUm UND MINISTERIALBURORAMTE
(1928) ; and by Grau, Rechtsprechung oder Gesetzgebung zur Anpassung des Privatrechts
an die Verdinderten Verlilitnisse (Germany, 1924) 122 ARcHLY Ti ZIVLIsTiscHE PRAXis
318.
141. Legislative revaluation was inaugurated by the Third Emergency Tax Ordinance
(Dritte Steuernotverordnung) of Feb. 14, 1924, 1924 REICHSGESETZBLATT I 74. An attempt
was made here to keep revaluation within bounds and to use the profits of the real estate own-
ers and of other "disburdened" debtors for taxation purposes with an eye to the necessary
balancing of the budget. But this scheme was soon defeated by the revaluation party. The
Third Emergency Tax Ordinance was replaced by the Revaluation Law (Aufwertungsge-
setz) of July 16, 1925, 1925 PRICHSGESETZBLATT I 117, which became the center of a large
body of legislation purporting revaluation of investments. The leading commentators of the
Revaluation Law are, Michaelis, Quassowski, Schlegelberger, Harmening and Neukirch.
More systematic is MfiGEL DAS GESAmTE AuFWERTUNGSREFCHT (5th ed. 1927). These all
include pertinent material outside the Revaluation Law proper. For a survey, see 2 STAU-
DINGER, op. cit. supra note 82, at 55 et seq.
Back of revaluation was the "recasting rule" of the German Coinage Laws of August 30,
1924, 1924 REIcHSGESETZBLATT II 254, § 5, 2, providing, in accord with the actual level of
stabilization (supra note 84), that in the payment of debts a trillion marks should be equal
to a reichsmark. It has been estimated that 6oooo to 70,000 freight cars, amounting to about
I,ooo freight trains, loaded with one mark notes would have been necessary to pay a reichs-
mark. JASTROW, op. cd. supra note 2, at 61.
x42. This rule developed a considerable importance in the international field. Before the
War several leading American life insurance companies, under a license of the German gov-
ernment, had established German branches which issued their policies on a mark basis. After
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retroactive revaluation was expressly allowed, provided payments were
made within a certain period (June 15, 1922 to February 14, 1924) or else
under protestation by the creditor who was thus rewarded for his disregard
of the legal tender law.144  Revalued debts were declared to be gold mark
debts in order to protect them (as far as words could) from the influence
of another inflation. Special and very reserved provisions were enacted
for the revaluation of the public debt. Ordinary bank accounts were ex-
cluded from revaluation, since they are not secured as are savings bank
accounts by revaluable reserves. Through this legislative system of elaborate
restrictions a comparatively clear and distinct regulation was wrought,
which, although limited to investments, sufficiently narrowed the field of liti-
gation. In this connection it might also be mentioned that the judgment of
November 28, 1923 had announced the necessity for distinguishing with re-
gard to revaluation as to mortgages on agricultural, industrial and urban real
estate, to take into consideration the various public charges upon real estate,
the statutory emergency protection of lessees, etc.-differentiations which
were eliminated by the legislature. It is difficult to imagine what the result
would have been had the government not succeeded on this score.1 45
D. Sociological Aspects
Envisaged from a sociological point of view the revaluation movement
was chiefly put through by the middle class which included the upper strata
of the bureaucracy, judicial as well as non-judicial. They all felt deceived
and distressed by the entire destruction of their savings and their inherited
fortunes, and saw no chance for even a partial restoration of their standard
of living except through revaluation. Workers, peasants, and industrialists
the collapse of the mark the insured demanded "free" rather than the limited statutory reval-
uation which, they claimed, was reserved to German companies. The German courts, however,
decided in favor of the American companies. Reichsgericht, Dec. 13, 1929, 127 R. G. Z. 20;
March io, 1931, 131 R. G. Z. 359. The interests involved in the question amounted to more
than a hundred million dollars.
143. Mortgages on German real estate totaled, before the war, more than 6o billion
marks, amounting to about 20% of the whole national wealth. NussBAum, LEHRBUCH DES
DEUTSCHEN HYPOTHIEKENWESENS (2d ed. 1921) 201.
144. The attitude of American legislatures and courts after the collapse of the continental
currency was entirely opposite. "It was decided that the creditors who had refused or evaded
payment were not entitled to receive the metallic value of their debts," i. e., they lost the
privilege of revaluation. HARGREAVES, op. cit. supra note 134, at 12, 21. In Germany, like-
-wise, the preference given to repudiating creditors had been strongly gainsaid. QUASSOWSKI,
KOMMENTAR zUm AUFWERTUNGSGESETZ (5th ed. 1927) 217.
145. Attempts were made to challenge statutory limitation of "free revaluation" as uncon-
stitutional. They were rejected by the Reichsgericht, March I, 1924, 107 R. G. Z. 370;
Reichsgericht, Nov. 4, 1925, 1ii R. G. Z. 320. In the first case the court held justifiable the
concern of the government that revaluation would lead "to a multitude of litigation hard to
overcome" and would result in long lasting uncertainty and jeopardy to real-estate credit [a
mortgage situation was involved in the case]. The court concludes therefrom that legislative
intervention was reasonable. Such discernment had appeared neither in the judgment of
Nov. 28, 1923, nor in the pronunciamento of the judges' association. It implies a belated
recognition of the incompetence of the judiciary. Remarkable is the "due-process" language
of the court, which had no basis in the "Weimar" constitution of the German Republic.
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then supporting the government 146 were not interested in revaluation; but
the middle class, through the Reichsgericht, succeeded in imposing its will
upon the government. Partisans of the revaluation doctrine repeatedly
sought its justification in a theory of "revolutionary emergency law" (revo-
lutioniires Notrecht) ,147 and this phrase was occasionally referred to, with no
objection, by the Reichsgericht itself.148  However, an emergency situation
does not confer revolutionary powers upon ordinary law courts. On the
contrary, it is during this very emergency situation where the law has to be
cherished and defended by the courts. The conduct of the Reichsgericht
comes distinctly into relief when contrasted with the procedure of the courts
of other countries. Thus, the depreciation of the Austrian crown, of which
1/14,4oo was left,149 meant to crown creditors practically entire expropria-
tion just as the depreciation of the mark did to mark creditors. And
Austria is a German country, with a law which on the whole has developed
along lines similar to the law of the German Reich. Moreover, Austria
had a large middle-class with a particularly broad and deeply rooted
bureaucracy. Nor did Austria lack advocates of revaluation. 150 However,
the Austrian middle class did not develop a political energy similar to that
demonstrated by corresponding German groups. To be sure Germany's
national economy was based to a much greater extent than that of Austrian
on a credit substructure, and therefore explains why a certain revaluation
was bound to come after the restabilization of the German monetary system.
146. The industrialist group was represented in the government through the populist
party (Volkspartei) under the leadership of Stresemann.
147. This notion was first advanced by Abraham, 1925 JuRIsTIscHE RUNDSCHAU 235, and
was adopted by other writers.
148. Judgment of Jan. 23, 1926, 8o SEuFFERTS ARcHrv 103. The "revolutionary" violent
mood of the Reichsgericht burst out when a Danish Court held the German mortgagee of
formerly German real estate liable to discharge the Danish owner who had tendered the nom-
inal amount of the debt. The Reichsgericht denied the Danish judgment enforcement, point-
ing out that the judgment was resting "on unethical grounds" ("auf unsittlicher Grundlage")
and that it offered an "ethically wicked argument" ("es begriinde die Forderung in sittlich
verwerflicher Weise"). Reichsgericht, June 25, 1926, II4 R. G. Z. i7. It would have been
entirely unobjectionable to allege that enforcement of the Danish judgment was contrary to
German public policy, but the court was in the spirit of combating an unintelligent world.
Still more aggressive, of course, were the partisan writings on revaluation. E. g., Professor
Stampe, leading sponsor of revaluation (see supra note 2) entitles his review of the present
author's book DAs GELD, Stricken with Blindness, intimating that "international big finance"
is behind nominalistic developments and that the "augurs in London, Paris and New York"
would find it hard to suppress their "shouts of joy" seeing an "honest German scholar" [the
present writer] advocating nominalism. Die Aufwertung, June i9, 1925. An irrational though
not unimportant undercurrent of the revaluation movement comes to light in such utterances.
149. This ratio between the Austrian crown and the new Austrian "shilling" was adopted
by the law of Dec. 20, 1924, 1924 BUNDESGESETZBLATT 1767, corresponding to the depreciation
of the crown to i/I4,4oo, the crown being fixed at 0.387 grams gold, the shilling at 0.235
grams. On the fate of the Austrian crown see VAN W~ABRi DE BORDES, TxE AUSTRIAN
CROWN (1927), particularly tables p. 114 et seq.
i5o. The Chief President of the Austrian Supreme Court, Dr. Roller, in his pamphlet
(1924) Geldentwertung, Rechtsprechung und Gesetzgebung. The most ardent Austrian ad-
vocate of revaluation, however, was Wahle. His volume, DAs VALORISATIONSPROBLEM IN DER
GESETZGEBUNG UND RECHTSPRECHUNG MI=TTLEUROPAS (1924), is valuable though the ample
references to Austrian and Czechoslovakian cases and writings. A survey on the attitude of
Austrian legal literature is presented by NussBAuM, op. cit. mpra note 82, at Io.
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It is not the German revaluation in itself, but its process and shape which
form, from a sociological point of view, the characteristic feature of the
movement. What happened was a judicial manifestation of the "desequi
librium" described by Professor Robbins, and, in ostensible legal terms, an
ominous deviation from, if not a distortion of, a great law and a great
tradition.151
III. REVALUATION IN GENERAL
A. Scaling Laws. Debts in Continental and Confederate Dollars
The rational scheme of revaluation, as indicated in the preceding dis-
cussion, would be a law reorganizing the national currency and, at the same
time, recasting in terms of the new currency debts articulated in terms of
the former depreciated monetary currency.152 Since the recasting is ordi-
narily done by scaling the debts on a time basis (normally the time of con-
tracting) the expression, "scaling law", frequently employed in American
technical language, seems appropriate. They appear as early as the middle
ages.'53 However, the most famous scaling laws are probably those which
were enacted in France following the breakdown of the paper currency of
the Great Revolution,' 54 the scaling laws of the several American states
after the experience with the Continentals, 155 the laws adopted after the
Civil War by various southern states for the regulation of Confederate cur-
151. Kant, in his METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF LEGAL THEORY (1797) 40, discusses the
case of a servant who at the end of a year was paid his annual wages in debased coin which
would not give him the same purchasing power as the coin had at the time of contracting.
Kant decides that in law the servant would not be entitled to relief, in the absence of a con-
tractual provision to the contrary: a court being wvithout authority to adjudicate a case on
undeterminable grounds.
152. An effect similar to revaluation of debts may be reached by devaluation of paper
money. The resourceful colonial legislators did not overlook this attractive device. Fisher,
The Tabular Stand in Massachusetts History (1913) 27 QUARTER.Y JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
417, discusses the laws enacted in 1742 under Governor Shirley and making a novel sort
("new tenor") of bills of credit legal tender. In case of depreciation of these notes it was
provided that judgments should be rendered either in terms of silver or in the bills with due
allowance for depreciation. Under a law of 1747, Mass. Laws 1747, c. I, it was further pre-
scribed that in determining the allowance regard should be had not only of the price of silver
and of bills of exchange, but of the prices of provisions and other necessities of life. This
amounts to a pre-planned revaluation, independent of currency reconstruction. Still the
system seems not to have functioned. Fisher, supra at 426. Furthermore, when Maryland
in 178o decided to exchange, at a ratio of 100 :3 continentals held by her citizens for new
Maryland bills, the legislature provided that in case of depreciation of the new bills a judicial
body should be authorized to fix for certain periods the rate at which the new bills must be
taken in payment. Md. Laws 1780, c. 8, § I8.
153. Particularly in France since the I4th Century. I-IJBRECnT, op. cit. supra note 2, at
52; LANDRY, EssAI -CONOMIQUE SUR LES MUTATIONS DE MONNAIES DANS L'ANCIENNE
FRANCE (I910). Outstanding was an ordinance of Henry II of December 15, 1421, II Les
Ordonnances des Rois de France 143; MATER, TR.ITf- JUR)DIQUE DR LA MONNAIE ET DU
CHANGE (1925) 121. China had a paper money inflation as early as the beginning of the 12th
Century A. D. See CARTER, THE INVENTIOx OF PRINTING IN CHINA AND ITS SPREAD WEST-
WARD (1925) 73, but there seems to be nothing known about an ensuing revaluation of debts.
154. HARGREAvES, op. cit. supra note 134, at 26 et seq.; 3 MARION, HIsTOIRE FiNANCIRE
DE LA FRANCE (1914) ; MATER, op. cit. supra note 153, at 112; Mater, La Dipreciation du
Papier-Monnaie et ses Consequences Juridiques de 179o a x8oo (France, 1924) 2 REvuE Du
DROIT BANCAIRE 72, 168, 266, 367.
155. HARGREA ES, op. cit. supra note 134, at I.
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rency debts,156 and the Austrian scaling laws of I81I-I813. 1 7 But revalua-
tion may also be achieved by a classification of the transactions involved
rather than by a consideration of the time of contracting, or by a combina-
tion of both classification and scaling. In more recent times the scaling
scheme seems to have fallen into desuetude. The German scheme of reval-
uation, through equitable judicial case-to-case appraisal of the surrounding
circumstances of the contract, was used in Poland and Hungary, but essen-
tially on legislative grounds and within much narrower ambits. 158  No re-
valuation was provided with regard to rouble debts, the objective of Com-
munist legislation having been rather the destruction of the creditors'
rights.
159
i56. See Dawson and Cooper, The Effect of Inflation on Private Contracts: United
States, 1861-Z879 (1935) 33 MIcH. L. REv. 706 at 707. An amazing multitude of state court
decisions has been collected by the writers.
X57. HARGREAvES, op. cit. supra note 134, at 73; WINWARTER, HANDBUCH DER JUSTIZ
UND PoLITsCHE GEsErzE (1829) 3, § 13 et seq.; Hoffmann, Die Devalvierung des Oester-
reichischen Papiergeldes iin .ahre i8zi (1923) 165 SCHMFTEN DES VzREINS FOR SOzMAWaOLI-
TIE.
158. In Poland, the Polish "mark" instituted during the war by the German occupational
authorities and taken over by the Polish government after Germany's defeat depreciated to
i,8oo,oooth and was, on this basis, converted into the "zloty" by a decree of Jan. 2o, 1924
(1924) 65 DzimNNiK UsTAv R. P. 88. Since 1922 the Polish Supreme Court has given relief
to creditors of "adaptable" debts and to the debtors of executory contracts. Moreover, the
court had, by a judgment of Feb. 25, 1922, 1923 J. W. 332, dismissed the claim of a mort-
gagor to have the mortgage stricken out in the landbook upon paying-off the nominal amount
of the debt. However, the court did not claim the power of determining the amount to be
paid; it rather pointed to a future legislative recasting rule promised by a law of May 9,
i919. No. 296, i919 DzIENNIK USTAV 489. This rule, then, was set by the decree of 1924.
Leaning somewhat on German legislation it extends standards of revaluation so as to include
loans and commercial credits of any kind, and it allows revaluation of paid-off debts only
where the creditor had reserved his rights. Although much narrower than under the Ger-
man law the powers conferred upon the courts still were very large and arbitrary. Kuratow-
Kuratowski, Les Probl~mes de la Baisse du Mark Polonais dans le Doinaine du Droit Priv6
(France, 1925) BuLLETI" DE LA SocIur] DE LfGISLATION COMPARIE 96; W. Muiller (Ger-
many, 1926) ZEITSCHiUF FOR OSmEcHT 1046. How the law operated in practice the writer
was unable to ascertain. Rukser in (Germany, 1930) ZErrscHRIFT FU-R OSTRECHT 321, men-
tions "the prudent self-restriction of the Polish courts in the administration of the revaluation
provisions." In Hungary, where the crown had depreciated to i/4OOOth, the courts, on a large
scale, granted compensation for loss through depreciation in the case of adaptable claims,
including claims for "delay" damages but did not proceed to a general revaluation of debts.
See the cases translated in (Germany, 1926) ZETSCHalr IFOT OSTRECHT 111. Definite regu-
lation was directed through an act of April I, 1928, rejecting "free" revaluation and strictly
limiting statutory revaluation. 2 REcHTSVERGLEICHENDES HANDWOERTRmUCH art. Aufwert-
101g 304 (1929) ; Sarrazin, Ungarns Stellung rur Aufwertung (Germany, 1928) 27 BAxK-
ARCHIV 414.
159. Although in some special cases courts seem to have arbitrarily granted a creditor
an equitable compensation. Still the importance of the cases is uncertain and they do not
affect the basic principle of annihilation of debts. Non-Russian courts have almost invari-
ably recognized the absence of revaluation in the Russian law. See Tillman v. Russo-Asiatic
Bank, 5I F. (2d) io23 (C. C. A. 2d, 1931) ; Parker v. Hoppe, 258 N. Y. 365, 179 N. E. 770
(1932); more distinctly, Dougherty v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc., 266 N. Y. 71, 193
N. E. 897 (934) ; Klochkov v. Petrogradski Bank, 239 App. Div. 687, 268 N. Y. Supp. 433
(ist Dep't, 1934), aff'd, 266 N. Y. 596, X95 N. E. 216 (1935) ; Perry v. Equitable Life Assur-
ance Soc., 45 T. L. R. 468 (I. B. Div. 1929); Mixed Court of Alexandria, June 23, 1927
(France, 1928) REvUE Du DROIT BANcAmE 356; French Court of Cassation, Feb. 25, 1929
(France, 1929) 56 JouR AL Du DROIT INTERNATIONAL 1306; Appellate Court of Paris, May
23, 1931, 59 id. 441; Superior Court of Zurich, Dec. 18, 1928, 57 id. ii59. German courts,
too, held rouble debts not revaluable under Russian law. Reichsgericht, Dec. 13, 1929, 1929
Warneyers Rechtsprechung 78; Appellate Court of Kiel, May io, 1930, 1931 J. W. i56.
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The American scaling laws of the continentals' period take as a basis
the value of the continentals in terms of silver at the time of contracting,
ordinarily fixing for each month a single ratio. 160 The French revolutionary
legislation, however, besides differentiating the ratios of revaluation accord-
ing to the various "departments", did not rely solely on the price of specie,
but set out, as the basis of revaluation, average figures freely computed from
prices paid for specie, for real estate, and for goods and wares.' 6 ' It
is remarkable that in the United States likewise a tendency appeared to
overcome the strict metal-value rule. Chief Justice Marshall in Faw v.
Marstellar 162 interpreted "true value in specie" used by the Virginian scaling
law to the effect that the difficulty in obtaining gold and silver coin at the
time should be disregarded, and "the real value of property" employed.
Although the affirmative part of this ruling is not very clear, an anti-metal-
listic attitude is distinctly present.
The scaling acts of the post-Civil War period are of only limited in-
terest. Enacted under heavy pressure by the then more or less bewil-
dered and incompetent legislatures of the defeated Confederate states,' 6 3
they had to remain within the boundaries of Article I, Section io of the
Federal Constitution, preventing the states from impairing the obligation
of contracts. Literally taken this meant a canonization of the whole body
of the judge-made law of contracts, and even the impossibility of restoring
obligations vanished through the annihilation of the Confederate currency.
Practically, the fate of the scaling laws was entrusted to the discretion of the
courts, particularly to the Supreme Court of the United States.164 The test
most frequently used by the acts in determining the extent of revaluation
was the value of the consideration furnished by the confederate-dollar credi-
tor to his debtor, looking toward the time of the inception of the transac-
tion.165 This doctrine certainly impaired the contract by substituting for
the price negotiated between the parties something like a fair value of the
object contracted for, and it was held unconstitutional by the Supreme Court
In the Reichsgericht, June 2, 1930, 1931 Leipziger Zeitschrift 384, a rouble debt between
German parties was revalued through application of German law. See also Roumanian Court
of Cassation, May 12, 1925 (France, 1925) 53 JoURNAL Du DROIT INT RNATIONAL 818 (Bessara-
bian case, Tsarist law). The only exception is Buerger v. New York Life Assurance Co.,
43 T. L. R. 6oi (C. A. 1927), Lord Scrutton dissenting, where the court relied on a defective
expertise, see Freund, (Germany, 1927) ZEITSCnIFr FOR OsTmcnrT 1379. The situation is
now clarified by the expertise in the Perry case, supra.
16o. HARGREAvES, op. cit. mtpra note 134.
161. HARGREAvEs, op. cit. supra note 134, at 49; CARON, TABLEAUX DE DABIECIATION DU
PAiE-MoNN A (19o9) and the other writers cited in note 154.
162. 2 Cranch io (U. S. 18o4).
163. Dawson and Cooper, sipra note 156, at 715. The conditions surrounding those legis-
latures have been described by historians. See 2 FLEMING, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF RE-
CONSTRUCTION (1907) 33.
164. Some states did not even possess any debt-regulation acts, or the latter were held
invalid by the courts. Dawson and Cooper, supra note 156, at 753.
165. Id. at 732, 747.
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in 1875,106 at a time when the work of liquidation and revaluation had
practically been consummated. More important are the affirmative contri-
butions of the Supreme Court to the revaluation problem. In Thorington v.
Smith,'67 the Court held that under an executory contract calling for pay-
ments in Confederate dollars the creditor was entitled to recover their actual
value at the time and place of the contract, thus clearly granting revaluation,
on the ground of the general law of contracts apart from any scaling law.
And in Bissell v. Heyward,16 8 determination of the value of the Confederate
dollar by reference to the United States dollar rather than to gold was held
conclusive. Thomas v. Richmond, 6 9 treating the same question, likewise
fits very well into a revaluation doctrine since the one and two dollar notes
of the City of Richmond, held invalid by the Court, constituted paper
money, unfit for revaluation for obvious reasons.Y70
The process of restoration of debts was limited to this development.
Debts incurred before the Civil War, of course, did not need to be revalued,
and contracts discharged by payment or otherwise remained closed.171 Re-
valuation had been started by legislation; its views, on the whole, were domi-
nant in the actual regulation of the problem. Apart from the "consideration"
test, the legislative position was basically adopted by the Supreme Court.
Revaluation, then, was attained by a mixed legislative-judicial proceeding,
under the guidance of the legislative branch of the government.
B. Judicial versus Legislative Revaluation
In the last analysis, there cannot be an exclusively judicial revaluation.
That legislation must cooperate was acknowledged even by the German
courts.' 7 2  Nevertheless, German revaluation was principally judicial. Ex-
amining it from the viewpoint of legal theory, we may leave aside the ex-
tremeness of the German rulings and especially their sweeping retroaction,
which were the result of historically unique political and economic conditions.
At any rate, the German example impressively illustrates the innate incom-
166. In Wilmington & Weldon R. R. v. King, 91 U. S. 3 (1875). It may be mentioned
that the Supreme Court of Alabama in Kirtland v. Molton, 41 Ala. 548 (1868) held uncon-
stitutional the Alabama act which had adopted the "consideration" test; after a reorganization
of the court the act was upheld in Herbert & Gessler v. Easton, 43 Ala. 547 (1869). See
Dawson and Cooper, supra note i56, at 734. This is, in addition to Briscoe v. Bank of the
Commonwealth of Kentucky, ii Pet. 257 (U. S. 1837), and the Legal Tender cases, the third
American instance of a reversal, by a newly tenanted highest court, of a decision on the con-
stitutionality of a monetary law.
167. 8 Wall. i (U. S. 1869).
i68. 96 U. S. 58o (1877). See also Ettinger v. Kenney, i15 U. S. 566 (885).
i69. 12 Wall. 349 (U. S. 1870).
17o. This was recognized by the Reichsgericht, lune 20, 1929, 125 R. G. Z. 273, and Nov.
25, 1926, 69 Gruchots Beitrage zur Erlduterung des Deutschen Rechts (1928) 369. It is
remarkable how the sound result was reached by both American and German courts from
an entirely different point of departure and through a wholly different kind of reasoning.
For a brief analysis of the German cases see NusSBAUM, op. cit. supra note 82, at 42.
171. Dawson and Cooper, supra note 156, at 718, 719.
172. See supra note 145.
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petence of courts to set up a revaluation law of their own through a mere
application of broad jural principles. As a matter of fact, revaluation means
revamping the economic structure of the country. Courts are called upon
to decide an individual controversy from very limited viewpoints. They
have neither the data, the training, nor the facilities to cope adequately with
a situation, which includes, besides its judicial aspects, so many relations
to the monetary system, taxation, banking, the conditions of farmers and
urban real property owners, and the like. It is the function of the legislature
to accomplish the final allotment among the various interests involved.1
73
Moreover, under any modern legal system, there are hindrances of
substantive laws which will stand in the way of an independent judicial
revaluation. Legal tender acts rest on strong reasons of public policy which,
weighty in themselves, become still more vital in emergency situations. Legal
tender laws distinctly require sacrifices from the individual when, within their
range, the interests of the individual collide with the interest of the com-
munity. Those peremptory rules of law cannot be pushed aside by con-
siderations of equity even if equity be recognized as an independent legal
system. It has been suggested 17- by American authors that in an extreme
depreciation the due-process clause may be successfully invoked against the
legal tender laws by injured dollar creditors. Yet in the situation presup-
posed it is not the legal tender laws which are to be blamed but their abuse
through unsound politics. And there is no constitutional protection from
unsound politics. The government may be charged with inaction in con-
nection with increasing injury to creditors, particularly for not having
changed the legal tender laws. But such inaction is hardly a ground for
constitutional relief. Moreover a change of the legal tender laws may just
precipitate the disaster. Obviously the legislative and political problems
involved cannot adequately be handled by the courts. Thus, not even the
Supreme Court of the United States with its unrivalled power, would be
authorized to ordain and shape revaluation. For technical reasons, too, this
Court would be unable to master the formidable task. One has to remember
that the Reichsgericht, a court embracing seven Civil-Senates, had to adjudi-
cate more than two thousand revaluation claims. 175 And surrendering the
development of the law, in a matter of national economy, to lower courts
would be even worse than having a poor, but uniform law.
It is apparent that the lesson contributed by the German judiciary to a
general theory of revaluation is essentially of a negative nature. In fact,
despite the numerous collapses of monetary systems in the post-war period,
173. It is remarkable that the Massachusetts General Assembly at once set aside under
the Act of 1747, Mass. Laws 1747, c. I, a finding of the Judges of the Supreme Court on the
depreciation in terms of silver, of the new-tenor notes. Fisher, op. cit. supra note 153, at 424.
174. Dawson and Cooper, The Inflation in the North, x862-1879 (1935) 33 MIcH. L.
REv. 852, 902.
175. Supra p. 590.
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it has not been followed anywhere.176 The Hooge Raad, highest court of
the Netherlands, and a tribunal inferior to no other, has stated a principle
of universal validity by these forceful phrases: "The will of the legislature
being the law of the parties, the court has no power, on the strength of its
own opinion as to equity and good faith, to discard and to supersede the
rule which the legislature, in considering all of the interest involved, has
ordained as the fairest and the most just one." 177
176. As to Poland, Hungary, and Russia, see supra notes 158, 159.
177. Jan. 2, 1931, Nederlandsche Jurisprudentie 274.
